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The study of the effectiveness of the Manager Airport "Macedonia" 1997

The study of the effectiveness of the Manager

Airport "Macedonia" 1997

The effectiveness of the dispatcher's approach to landing at the airport "Macedonia" was studied in order to determine how well his actions corresponded to the necessary ATC procedures. The data show that he gave dispatch permits in accordance with ICAO standards and requirements, as is evident from the excerpt from the negotiations with 18: 55 ': 58 "to 18: 56': 32"; efficiently assure separation of the aircraft he flew and subsequent flights.
Manager is completely dependent on the information provided to him by the crew on location and flight parameters AEW-241. on the basis of which he can
assess whether an aircraft requires an air traffic service other than that. which are provided by applicable rules and regulations.

In the absence of radar guidance, the perception of the flight controller completely depends on his experience and the quality of information that the flight crew provides. If this information is inaccurate, this immediately leads to a lack of input information so that the controller can control the situation, since he has no other data to perform a control check on the state of the aircraft and the flight, he encountered this while working with this data A specific flight. In this case, AEW-241 did not provide the dispatcher with accurate information and the dispatcher, having his own shortcomings in the correct assessment of the situation, could not understand the critical situation in which the aircraft was in order to be able to intervene immediately. The AEW-241 crew made inquiries The dispatcher to provide additional guidance at the following times.

The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

All the above requests show that the flight crew was under the impression that they were in the zone with the presence of radar equipment. The flight crew had previous experience of flying to the airport “Macedonia" and apparently the rem were not familiar with the radio equipment and communication systems there, as indicated in the official AIS of Greece. In addition, they could learn that there is no radar guidance on the following When they first contacted Macedonia’s dispatcher service and when they reported “6131 autoresponder signal, the dispatcher didn’t respond to the“ seizure of locators ”or was“ recognized ”, but responded in the usual form for areas with no radar equipment.

No scheme "radar vectoring area" for the airport "Macedonia".

There is no mention in SAN of Greece that the AIS has radar equipment at the airport "Macedonia" clearly indicates that here, in an emergency and on request, guidance is possible on a military locator (TUGRIT service). the “(R)” mark without a mark that this refers to the military TUGRIT Service, and not to the TAR (aerodrome zone radar).

The radio exchange between the flight crew and the ATC was conducted in English, which was used as a universal communication environment because the national languages ​​of air traffic controllers and the flight crew were Greek and Russian respectively. As is clear, during the first part of the flight with the approach, the talks did not differ much from the usual ones. But with the continuation of the flight it becomes obvious that although both sides have skills in English, however, neither side has so much freedom to go beyond the usual terms of air traffic exchange ATC. To describe and assimilate the degree of a critical situation that has developed rapidly.

In contrast to his request for an additional (radar) guidance of the flight crew is constantly expressed confidence in their location, their trajectories and their ability to perform the approach procedure, which provides the dispatcher.

The investigation revealed that if two vectoring requests in 19: 07 *: 50 "and 19 08 ': 03" could give some indication that AEW-241 is experiencing difficulties, one would expect the controller to understand about the presence of the flight crew of difficulties. Although the flight crew did not talk about the problems in their ability to comply with ATC instructions, the above requests could provide some indication of the existence of potential difficulties.

The dispatcher emphasized in his explanation that his opinion about the AEW-241 crew was such that their messages were incomplete from the very beginning, which made him repeat his instructions and specifically request confirmations. He could not understand why they did not fulfill his commands and why they did not inform him of their difficulties. The dispatcher claimed that he was confident (like the other witnesses in his explanations) that AEW-241 was on the northern route after the second round. When analyzing the chain of events during the radio exchange between the flight crew and the controller, it is clear that the most critical point was the exchange of 19: 07: 50 "when AEW-241 requested a direction vector" and the controller informed that: "We cannot provide radar guidance and run the runway VOR-DMA-ILS. This moment was a unique case of breaking the “chain of events”.

In 19: 09: 38 aircraft reported "position (interference), two eight miles." ATC manager thought that the aircraft is moving at or near the focus of SLM R344 BOP. This location falls into the area of ​​terminal control area of ​​Thessaloniki. which extends in the direction to 38 DME SLM.

At the same time, it was thought that the aircraft is safe from ground obstacles, because the location of 28 DME SLM on radials 344 SLM BOP is within the prescribed minimum safe altitude (25 DME from micro / BOP 29 DME from SLM / BOP), as well as except that the second is inside the buffer zone around the driven directories flight procedures in the northern zone of expectations.

The reasons why the crew did not declare an emergency, remain unknown and devoid of logical explanation.

  1. Full information about the vessel
  2. Information about downloading and ship the balance
  3. Information on meteorological conditions Airport "Macedonia"
  4. Information about the location and the very clash
  5. Place the debris and factors vizhivaemosti
  6. Analysis: General Terms of Crash
  7. Overview of confusion in the cockpit
  8. The study of the effectiveness of the Manager
  9. Basic facts about the crash of the Yak-42
  10. The main causes of the disaster

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