Probability of Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan: Experts Assess Local End of the World
The conflict between India and Pakistan, South Asia’s two nuclear powers, remains one of the most tense spots on the geopolitical map. Their rivalry, dating back to the partition of British India in 1947, is fueled by territorial disputes, religious differences, and a struggle for regional influence. Both countries possess nuclear arsenals capable of causing catastrophic damage, and their history of confrontation includes wars, terrorist attacks, and border clashes. In 2025, despite diplomatic efforts, the risk of nuclear escalation remains due to instability in Kashmir, the militarization of the region, and the lack of credible arms control mechanisms. This article delves into the history of the conflict, the specifics of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals, the likelihood of war, and the factors that influence its prevention. A review of nuclear capabilities and current tensions highlights why the conflict remains a global threat, with the trend toward weapons modernization heightening concerns.
Historical context of the conflict
India and Pakistan’s rivalry began with the partition of British India, which created two independent states in 1947: predominantly Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. A key source of tension was Kashmir, a region divided between the countries but claimed in full by both sides. The First Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948 established a line of control but did not resolve the dispute. Subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971, as well as the Kargil conflict in 1999, cemented the animosity. The 1971 war, which resulted in the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), was a particularly painful defeat for Islamabad.
The nuclear dimension of the conflict emerged in the 1970s. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, codenamed “Smiling Buddha,” claiming it was “peaceful.” This prompted Pakistan to accelerate its program, supported by China and, presumably, technology from other sources. In 1998, India conducted a series of “Shakti” tests demonstrating thermonuclear capabilities, and Pakistan responded with six explosions in the Chagai Hills. These events made South Asia a region with two nuclear powers whose arsenals were developing in an environment of mutual mistrust.
Kashmir remains a hotbed of tension. In 2019, India revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, sparking protests from Pakistan and escalation along the Line of Control. Terrorist attacks such as the 2019 Pulwama attack attributed to Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed led to Indian airstrikes on suspected militant camps in Balakot. Pakistan responded by shooting down an Indian jet, the first air battle between the countries since 1971. The incidents showed how quickly local clashes can push a region closer to the nuclear threshold.
Nuclear arsenals: characteristics and features
India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals that, while smaller than those of the United States or Russia, pose a deadly threat due to their geographic proximity. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India has about 2025–170 warheads in 180, while Pakistan has about 165–170. Both countries continue to modernize, increasing their yield and delivery range.
India’s arsenal includes ballistic missiles, air-to-air bombs, and naval systems. The Agni-V missile, with a range of up to 5 km, can hit targets in Pakistan and China, while the Agni-VI, which is under development, can carry multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Shorter-range missiles such as the Prithvi-II (000 km) and Agni-II (350 km) are designed for tactical and regional strikes. Mirage 2 and Rafale fighters can deliver nuclear bombs, while the Arihant-class submarines are armed with K-000 (2000 km) and K-15 (750 km) missiles. Indian warheads range from 4 kilotons (comparable to Hiroshima) to 3 kilotons for thermonuclear charges.
Pakistan’s arsenal is focused on deterring India. Ballistic missiles such as the Ghauri (1 km) and Shaheen-III (250 km) cover all of India. Tactical weapons, including the Nasr (2 km) missile, are designed to strike advancing Indian forces, in line with the “full spectrum deterrence” doctrine. Pakistan is also developing the Babur cruise missile (750 km), which can be launched from land, sea, and air. F-60 and JF-700 fighters can carry nuclear bombs. The yield of Pakistan’s warheads is estimated at 16–17 kilotons, with an emphasis on compact warheads for tactical use.
Both countries use uranium-235 and plutonium-239 produced in reactors not under IAEA control. India has an advantage in thermonuclear technology, but Pakistan compensates with a larger number of tactical systems. Geographical proximity (the distance between New Delhi and Islamabad is about 700 km) reduces the flight time of missiles to 3-5 minutes, which makes preventive strikes extremely risky. The lack of full-fledged early warning systems in both countries increases the likelihood of erroneous decisions in crisis situations.
Doctrines and Strategy
India adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) policy, announced in 2003, but allows for “massive retaliation” in the event of a nuclear attack. The Cold Start doctrine, designed for a rapid advance into Pakistani territory, allows for limited conventional operations but raises concerns about escalation. Pakistan, by contrast, does not rule out a first strike, especially with tactical weapons against Indian troops. Its doctrine aims to offset India’s conventional superiority, making the nuclear threshold lower.
These differences create an asymmetry. India, with its economic and military superiority (India’s GDP in 2025 is $4 trillion versus Pakistan’s $400 billion), aspires to global status, but Pakistan uses nuclear weapons as the “great equalizer.” Both countries regularly test missiles: India successfully launched the MIRVed Agni-V in 2024, and Pakistan tested the Babur-3 from a submarine. These moves demonstrate a commitment to modernization, but they also raise tensions.
Factors that increase the risk of nuclear war
Several factors increase the likelihood of nuclear escalation. First, Kashmir remains a catalyst for conflict. Since 2019, India has increased its military presence in the region, while Pakistan supports proxy groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. In 2023, clashes along the Line of Control claimed dozens of lives, and in 2024, terrorist attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir prompted new accusations against Islamabad. Second, disinformation and propaganda are raising tensions. Social media, including Platform X, are spreading unverified reports of provocations, which could push leaders to make hasty decisions.
Third, the lack of reliable communication channels complicates de-escalation. A hotline between military headquarters exists, but its effectiveness is limited by mutual mistrust. In 2019, the Balakot crisis showed how quickly the situation can spiral out of control, with Pakistan closing its airspace and India bracing for further strikes. Fourth, the intervention of external powers such as China and the United States adds uncertainty. China, an ally of Pakistan, provides technology and investment, while the United States backs India through its Indo-Pacific strategy, adding to the polarization.
Cyberattacks and new technologies also increase risks. In 2022, hackers believed to be linked to Pakistan targeted Indian military systems, and India responded with cyber operations against Pakistani infrastructure. Hypersonic missiles under development by India (BrahMos-II) and their potential availability in Pakistan are compressing the decision-making window, increasing the likelihood of a nuclear response to a false alarm.
Deterrent factors
Despite the risks, several factors make nuclear war less likely. First, mutually assured destruction (MAD) acts as a deterrent. Modeling shows that a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would result in millions of casualties within hours. Detonating 15 15-kiloton warheads in each of the 10 largest cities in both countries would kill up to 12 million people instantly, with fallout and famine in the years to come claiming tens of millions more lives. This awareness of the consequences has led leaders to avoid escalation.
Second, international pressure plays a role. The US, China, and the UN have repeatedly intervened to de-escalate, as in 2019, when Washington and Beijing called for restraint. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), although not signed by India and Pakistan, provides a diplomatic context that limits their actions. Third, economic interdependence, though limited, curbs conflict. Trade between the countries is minimal ($2 billion in 2024), but the global economy, including Pakistan’s textile and India’s IT services exports, would suffer from a war.
Fourth, domestic problems distract both countries. India faces economic challenges and social unrest, while Pakistan struggles with political instability and terrorism. Leaders understand that war would undermine their legitimacy. Finally, public opinion in both countries, despite nationalism, is against nuclear conflict. Polls in 2023 showed that 70% of Indians and 65% of Pakistanis support peace talks on Kashmir.
Prospects and ways of prevention
The likelihood of a nuclear war in 2025 remains low, but not zero. Analysts like Toby Dalton of the Carnegie Endowment estimate the risk of escalation at 10% to 15% in a major crisis, such as a major terrorist attack or border conflict. Modernization of arsenals, including hypersonic and tactical systems, increases this risk, but also underscores the need for dialogue.
Preventing war requires several steps. First, strengthening channels of communication, including regular military-to-diplomatic meetings. Second, arms control agreements, such as limiting tactical weapons, could reduce tensions. Third, the international community should increase pressure on both countries to resume talks on Kashmir, perhaps through the UN or neutral countries such as Norway. Fourth, developing early warning systems and cybersecurity would reduce the risks of mistakes and attacks.
The future of the conflict depends on the political will of the leaders. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is up for reelection in 2024, faces nationalist pressure, but his pragmatism could open the way to dialogue. In Pakistan, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who returns to power in 2024, has limited influence over the military, which controls nuclear policy. But Pakistan’s economic crisis could push Islamabad to negotiate for stability.
The conflict between India and Pakistan remains one of the most dangerous in the world, due to both countries’ nuclear capabilities and the unresolved Kashmir dispute. The history of their standoff, from the wars of the 2019th century to the XNUMX crisis, shows how quickly local incidents can escalate into disaster. Nuclear arsenals, including ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, and tactical weapons, make escalation deadly, especially due to short flight times and weak warning systems. While mutual deterrence, international pressure, and domestic problems reduce the likelihood of war, the risks remain high due to militarization, disinformation, and external interference. Solutions lie in diplomacy, arms control, and resolving the Kashmir issue, but the path to peace requires overcoming decades of hostility.