Analysis: General provisions for the collapse of the Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.
Analysis: General provisions for the collapse of the Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

Analysis: General provisions on the crash of the Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.


The Board of Inquiry examined the actions of the flight crew in order to clarify how it could happen that the four members of the licensed crew allowed the aircraft's course and his crash in the area of ​​mountainous terrain.

The Council examined the action of the ATC "Macedonia" in order to determine what role, if any, these actions have played in the accident. There were also carefully examined all other parameters "could affect the accident, such as. navigation equipment, as well as issues of survival in order to clarify the extent to which damage can be reduced, and death outcomes electronic interference.

The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

During the first alarm ASO recorded remark about the mountains. that confirms the opinion expelled in paragraph (2.4). The third and fourth alert included due to the fact that the aircraft flew in the direction of the mountainous terrain and heights but radio devices rapidly decreased.

The warning signal in 19: 12: 10 (the third alarm) passed without any response from the crew. They were followed by the guidance of the "INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS" INSTRUCTIONS Dx1 the crew of the airborne ship when the warning system of "CLIMBING WITH LAND" works. If they took the appropriate maneuver By climbing, it is likely that they were able to cross the mountains. "During the fourth alarm signal, a red light" CONVERSION WITH LAND "(MRC) was lit on the panel of the emergency board and for the first time the need for climbing yla recognized by the flight crew. The commander realized the danger of the situation and began to maneuver to prevent a collision with the ground, but it was too late.

Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and the darkness of the crew have limited opportunities to get acquainted with the terrain. Unexplained reasons for the issuance of SSCA alarms. As well as the current conditions in the control room (loss of awareness of the situation) reduced the ability of the flight crew to recognize and interpret correctly, the seriousness of the situation. The implementation of preventive actions by the flight crew in response to the alarms of the AHRS system is a very serious subject for consideration by the international aviation community, while taking into account the reliability of the various ASH systems, situational awareness of the crew and their subsequent operations in accordance with the ICAO Circular 217-AN / I32 Handbook on Human Factors 2. Page 5 training KRU is as follows:

  • A complete system to improve the efficiency of the crew, with the inclusion of all members of the flight crew.
  • The system, which can be extended to all forms of training of flight crew.
  • Use the flight crew as a training unit.


The Board has carefully studied as a recording on the cockpit voice recorder and transcripts of ATC. The absence in the cabin of the person with the command position is more than obvious. When investigating the sequence of events were not found any evidence that the flight crew tried to apply the concept in practice, switchgear, as well as there was no evidence that the crew was trained in Crewe.


• In the cockpit, during the last 30 minutes of the flight, no control checks were carried out. According to the Instructions for performing flights on the Yak-42 aircraft, the following control checks should be carried out:

  • - Control check before descent.
  • - Control check before changing to aerodrome barometric pressure (QNH).
  • - Control check after landing gear.
  • - Control check before the start of the glide path.


Although the flight crew during the flight, and said several times about their fears, but none of the pilot (up to 19: 07 ': 40 ") admitted that they had lost control of the situation (situation awareness). In general we can avenge that:

  • - No one was aware of the specific go-around procedure, even when attempts were made to perform this procedure.
  • - The flight path was not controlled by the appropriate approach procedures.
  • - Nobody had a conceptual idea of ​​the procedures that should be followed.


The AEW-241 collided with the ground while each crew member was individually busy looking. that he was solving his problems, because they lost control of the situation and the terrain over which the flight took place. This situation could have been avoided if the summer crew had been trained in KRU in which the roles of each pilot and the concept of teamwork are clearly defined. inter alia, the necessary control of the situation was ensured, as well as the appropriate procedures in accordance with flight instructions, approach procedures and ATC clearances.

Such cross-checks of actions in the cockpit provides a "safe" method for detecting human errors, which if not discovered can actually disrupt the safe operation of the aircraft.


  1. Full information about the vessel
  2. Information about downloading and ship the balance
  3. Information on meteorological conditions Airport "Macedonia" 
  4. Information about the location and the very clash
  5. Place the debris and factors vizhivaemosti
  6. Analysis: General Crash Considerations
  7. Overview of confusion in the cockpit
  8. The study of the effectiveness of the Manager
  9. Basic facts about the crash of the Yak-42
  10. The main causes of the disaster


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