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March 07 2017

The statement of Rosaviation on the possible causes of the disaster in Altai is an attempt to put pressure on the IAC and the spread of speculation about the causes of the accident in Altai.

March 3 2017, the Federal Air Transport Agency issued a statement (httr: // іd = 3344?), Where the said violation of the pilot, which, according to authorities, could lead to disaster. AOPA-Russia would like to state the following.
In accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, the causes of the accident are investigated by a specially created commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC). Paragraph 2.6 of the Rules for the investigation of accidents and incidents with civil aircraft in the Russian Federation (PRPI) says that only the Commission is authorized to make public statements on the progress of the investigation and the possible causes. The information published by the Federal Air Transport Agency is nothing more than speculation and cynical juggling with facts. We believe that the publication of the statement is an attempt to put pressure on public opinion in order to create a negative attitude towards GA and those who died in this catastrophe, and is also an attempt to put pressure on the Commission for the investigation of an accident. We also consider it necessary to publish the AOPA-Russia point of view on the “assumptions” put forward by Rosaviation:

1. Overdue medical report.

Dmitry Rakitsky had a medical certificate of the 1 class, the validity of which is in accordance with the Federal Aviation Regulations "Medical examination of flight, control, flight attendants, cadets and candidates entering civil aviation educational institutions" approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport from 22 April 2002. N 50 (FAP-50), is one year, and which has expired a few days before the accident. This flight was carried out for general aviation purposes (AON), for which there is enough medical conclusion of 2 class, which, in accordance with FAP-50 with a smaller volume of medical examinations and reduced requirements for health, is issued for a period of two years. Thus, the health condition of the pilot-in-command was in accordance with the requirements of the air law for this flight.

2. Flight on unequipped floats aircraft.

The 3 section of the section "Additional conditions, restrictions and information for R66" of the data card to the certificate of the type ST337-R66 issued by the MAK established that "Flights above the water surface without installed floats at a distance from the coastline exceeding the planning distance on autorotation mode are prohibited ". In accordance with the RLE helicopter R66, the aerodynamic quality during autorotation is 5.5: 1. The width of the lake in the place of AP is 3 km. Thus, even in the middle of the lake it was enough to be at an altitude of 270 meters to safely land in autorotation mode on the shore of the lake. This is the normal altitude of the flight, which, according to the data card, makes the floats not mandatory for such a flight. Based on the logic of Rosaviation, any flight crossing a river or other body of water, without the presence of floats on the Robinson R-66 helicopter, is impossible.

3. Resolution of the Reserve for takeoff and landing.

In accordance with paragraph 40 of the Federal Airspace Use Rules (OP TI): “Airspace users are required to use the airspace in restricted areas and restricted flight areas ... to obtain permission from persons in whose interests such zones are established.” As is known, an employee of the reserve allowed the helicopter to land on the cordon, and the subsequent takeoff. The current aviation legislation does not provide for the crew’s duty to clarify internal procedures for issuing permits from reserve personnel. Also, as well as the motorist should not receive permission to pass the intersection at the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and instructions of the employee of traffic police are enough.

4. The lack of notification.

Pilots flying at the accident site confirm the absence of two-way VHF communications with air traffic services (ATS), at altitudes up to 2000 meters. This airspace is served by the local control tower (TIR) ​​"Barnaul", which is part of the Air Navigation Branch of Western Siberia, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "State Corporation for Air Traffic Management", a subordinate enterprise of the Federal Air Transport Agency.
PT TTI in force at the time of the accident, was allowed to make a notification on the radio, at the same time responding to the notification PT TTI do not provide. Given the fact that the notification could be made without receipt of the TIR response, the statement that the notification has not been sent is unfounded. It is also known that the receipt or non-receipt of notice by the ATS unit has not served as a factor in the development of the accident - the event said the witness.

Thus, AOPA-Russia believes that none of these factors could affect the development of the accident. We propose to respect the laws of the Russian Federation, the Commission of Inquiry, as well as to the memory of fallen into a catastrophe, and to refrain from premature populist statements until after the official investigation.