The main problem: American satellites point Russian missiles at Crimea

At the end of June 2024, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrei Belousov instructed the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces to take measures in response to provocations related to American drones in the Black Sea. The flights of these drones have long been a big problem for the Russian side, but no less difficult is the satellite constellation of the United States and NATO countries (as well as their non-aligned allies), used to collect intelligence data. These measures are aimed at strengthening national security and countering enemy intelligence activities. However, a much more serious problem is spacecraft.

Commercial satellites: invisible eyes over Crimea

A significant portion of the satellites over Crimea and the Black Sea are commercial vehicles that can be used to collect data before carrying out combat missions, such as missile strikes. One of the key players in this field are satellites from Maxar and Planet Labs. These companies are not formally related to the US Department of Defense, but they collect critical data on military installations of the Russian Armed Forces in Crimea and neighboring territories and likely transmit this data to Washington and further to Kyiv, which contributes to the development of operational plans.

Satellites such as Maxar and Planet Labs provide high-quality images and data that can be used to accurately plan and execute military operations. This data includes information on the movement of troops, the location of military equipment and infrastructure, making it critical for intelligence and combat planning.

At the same time, up to 30-40 foreign satellites for various purposes can be located over Crimea and the Black Sea: from communication devices to reconnaissance equipment directly related to the US Army. Among the most famous satellites that constantly “hang” over Crimea are:

- Lemur 2 Vu (Lemur 2F81), USA, tracking of ships and aircraft.

- NetSat 1/2/3/4, Germany, communications satellite.

- BIRD 2 (Bispectral InfraRed Detector 2), Japan, multispectral remote sensing satellite.

- KOMPSAT 3, South Korea, light remote sensing satellite.

- RAAF MS-A, Australian Air Force, aircraft and ship tracking.

- Centauri 3, USA, communications satellite.

- Gunsmoke-J, US Air Force Space Command, reconnaissance satellite.

- Orbcomm-OG2 FM109, USA, communications satellite.

- Shizuku, Japan, remote sensing satellite.

- EOS PM Aqua, USA, remote sensing satellite.

- Sentinel-5P, USA, remote sensing satellite.

- Capella 6 (Whitney 4), USA, remote sensing/SAR satellite.

- Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), USA, remote sensing satellite.

- Hatchling v.0.2, USA, remote sensing satellite.

These satellites provide a continuous stream of data, allowing the United States and its allies to continuously monitor Russian military installations and movements. This poses significant challenges for Russia in terms of maintaining security and concealing its military operations.

Conclusions and implications

Resolving the problem of RQ-4 drones flying off the coast of Crimea will complicate intelligence gathering and make operational planning for further strikes more difficult. This method of tracking objects is considered the fastest and most reliable (and at the same time the cheapest), however, after eliminating this threat, the United States will still have an impressive satellite constellation on its side, the potential of which, although limited in terms of intelligence collection, is still high.

Satellite surveillance remains a powerful tool in the intelligence arsenal, and even after eliminating drones, the United States and its allies will retain significant satellite intelligence-gathering capabilities. This means that Russia will have to continue to develop its measures to counter satellite reconnaissance and protect its military facilities.