Results and conclusions: The disaster Fly Dubai
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Results and conclusions: The disaster Fly Dubai

Results and conclusions: The disaster Fly Dubai


Official conclusions of the IAC commission on the causes of the B737 Fly Dubai disaster will be made public on 19 April 2016, but now Rosaviatsia indirectly confirmed the version stated in some media that the pilots lost their spatial orientation, which led to the tragedy. Moreover, Rosaviatsiya, without waiting for an official statement, the Commission for the Investigation of the Catastrophe, issued a bulletin for all Russian airlines operating a narrow-bodied B737. The reason for the release of this prescription was the preliminary findings of the commission on the catastrophe in Rostov-on-Don, and the results of the investigation of the disaster in Kazan in 2013. In both cases, the crew performed a missed approach to the second round.

Rosaviation ordered all Russian airlines

check the skill of pilots B737 go to the second round

during landing interrupts and ability to display the aircraft

of complex spatial position.

Deputy Head of the Federal Air Transport Agency Oleg Storchevoy, an experienced pilot, one of the first mastered B737 in Russia, issued a newsletter prescriptive check the aptitude of all, and if you need to retrain all the pilots of aircraft in its class. This preventive measure is necessary to reduce the likelihood of accidents with Boeing 737 because of the human factor.

The similarity of the factors which led to the tragedy, in both cases, has allowed the leadership to draw conclusions about the lack of work natrenirovannosti pilots in similar situations. Special attention is recommended to be given to the actions of pilots in the longitudinal channel - height. It is necessary to further explore the technique missed after balked landing "in manual mode and with different heights."

According to O. Storchevoy, preparation for action in critical situations should be included in the pilot's regular training program. The Federal Air Transport Agency does not exclude that the accompanying factors in both disasters could be both bad weather and design flaws in the B 737. In particular, flaws in the elevator drive units. Recall that during the investigation of the disaster in Kazan, workings and metal shavings were found in this mechanism.

Considering that the commission nevertheless recognized the crew's mistakes by a majority of votes the cause of the tragedy, the Federal Air Transport Agency decided to complicate the methodology for training pilots on simulators. Trainees will perform go-arounds with a windshear warning and a jammed elevator.

Today, after decryption of all airborne recorders Boeing 737-800 FlyDubai, IAC experts and Federal Air Transport Agency managed to fully restore the situation on board.

The second approach the aircraft produced in the complex, but not prohibitive weather conditions.

Visibility, about 5 km.

The lower edge of the cloud-630 meters

Wind 13-18 m \ s, almost passing for sitting down 218 degree course aircraft.

Manager terrestrial service has confirmed the absence of wind shear. During the second call, down to 220 meters, the crew, for some unknown reason decided to go-around. Perhaps the reason for such a decision was the warning from the onboard systems of wind shear, arrived at 20: 42 UTC, still in the process of the first approach.

Because of the strong turbulence at this height, it was decided to make the climb in the director (manual) mode.

As a result, landing gear, flaps, the plane began to climb sharply, while remaining on the supercritical angles of attack. Further, voice recorder registered a conflict between the pilots: commander was holding the steering wheel in a climb, while the co-pilot, trying to prevent the inevitable stall, overtighten the action of the first pilot, giving the wheel "on yourself." This voice recorder recorded the cries of the co-pilot, addressed to the commander: "Stop! Stand!"

737-governance system, based on the transmission of electrical impulses from the steering column to the action on-board computer, simply disconnected. Getting contradicting instructions from both pilots, the control system disunite. As a result of the loss of pitch control, the plane sharply "pecked" nose, and began to dive from a height of about 1000 meters.

The pilots realized their error when literally hung on seatbelts, experiencing negative overload -1g. At the airport the lights, which had already been seen visually, it was clear and the spatial position of the aircraft. But it was too late, the car with an angle of about 50 degrees, with transcendent left roll, at a speed of 370 km \ hour fell to the ground.

According to the news portal,

neither Rosaviatsia, nor the IAC have not commented

issued a circular for airlines 

as well as its possible relationship with the results

the investigation of accidents in Kazan and Rostov-on-Don.


Chronology of the disaster can be found here.

Valery Smirnov specifically for

"The control system of the 737, based on the transmission of electrical impulses from the actions of the steering column to the on-board computer, simply turned off" ??? Has the B737 already received the fly-by-wire or am I missing something? "Receiving conflicting commands from both pilots, the control system was disconnected" - the elevator CC transfer mechanism operates in a slightly different way. Instead of looking for "witches", that is, shavings in the PCU or somewhere else, we would study in more detail the functions of the elevator feel computer in this situation and the logic of the synthetic speed stability augmentation in the manufacturer's patents. Maybe they would have found something interesting ...

Greater delirium only on Me?


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