The study of the effectiveness of the Manager

Airport "Macedonia" 1997

The performance of the approach controller at Macedonia Airport was studied to determine if it was in line with the necessary ATC procedures. Evidence indicates that he granted ATC clearances in accordance with ICAO standards and requirements, as can be seen from an excerpt of negotiations from 18: 55 ': 58 "to 18: 56': 32"; efficiently maintaining separation of the aircraft he was flying and subsequent flights.

Manager is completely dependent on the information provided to him by the crew on location and flight parameters AEW-241. on the basis of which he can

assess whether an aircraft requires an air traffic service other than those. which are provided in accordance with applicable rules and regulations.

In the absence of radar guidance, the perception of the flight controller completely depends on his experience and the quality of information that the flight crew provides. If this information is inaccurate, this immediately leads to a lack of input information so that the controller can control the situation, since he has no other data to perform a control check on the state of the aircraft and the flight, he encountered this while working with this data A specific flight. In this case, AEW-241 did not provide the dispatcher with accurate information and the dispatcher, having his own shortcomings in the correct assessment of the situation, could not understand the critical situation in which the aircraft was in order to be able to intervene immediately. The AEW-241 crew made inquiries The dispatcher to provide additional guidance at the following times.

The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

All of the above inquiries indicate that the flight crew was under the impression that they were in an area with radar equipment. The flight crew had previous experience of flying to Macedonia airport and apparently were not familiar with the radio equipment and communication systems available there, as indicated in the official AIS of Greece. In addition, they might have learned that there is no radar guidance on the following At the first contact with the dispatch service "Macedonia" and when they reported "Answering machine signal 6131y, the dispatcher did not answer" locator lock "or" identified ", but responded in the form usual for areas with no radar equipment.

No scheme "radar vectoring area" for the airport "Macedonia".

There is no mention in SAN Greece that there is radar equipment at the airport "Macedonia" AIS clearly indicates that here, in an emergency and upon request, it is possible to target by a military locator (TUGRIT service) In the 11 * 1 scheme for the airport "Macedonia" it is inaccurate the sign "(R)" without a mark that it refers to the military service TUGRIT and not to TAR (aerodrome view radar).

The radio exchange between the flight crew and the ATC was conducted in English, which was used as a universal communication environment because the national languages of air traffic controllers and the flight crew were Greek and Russian respectively. As is clear, during the first part of the flight with the approach, the talks did not differ much from the usual ones. But with the continuation of the flight it becomes obvious that although both sides have skills in English, however, neither side has so much freedom to go beyond the usual terms of air traffic exchange ATC. To describe and assimilate the degree of a critical situation that has developed rapidly.

In contrast to his request for an additional (radar) guidance of the flight crew is constantly expressed confidence in their location, their trajectories and their ability to perform the approach procedure, which provides the dispatcher.

Investigation showed that if the two vectoring requests at 19: 07 *: 50 "and 19 08 ': 03" could give some indication that the AEW-241 is in trouble, then one would expect the dispatcher to understand the flight crew has difficulties. Although the flight crew did not speak of problems in their ability to comply with ATC instructions, the aforementioned requests could provide some indication of potential difficulties.

The dispatcher in his explanation emphasized that his opinion of the AEW-241 crew was such that their messages were incomplete from the outset, which forced him to repeat his instructions and specifically request confirmation. He could not understand why they did not obey his commands and why they did not inform him of their difficulties. The dispatcher stated that he was confident (as did other witnesses in their explanations) that AEW-241 was on the northern route after going around. When analyzing the chain of events during the radio exchange between the flight crew and the dispatcher, it can be seen that the most critical point was the exchange 19:07:50 ", when AEW-241 requested" direction vectoring ", and the dispatcher informed that: 'We cannot provide radar guidance and carry out VOR-DME-ILS approach to the runway This moment was a unique opportunity to break the chain of events.

In 19: 09: 38 aircraft reported "position (interference), two eight miles." ATC manager thought that the aircraft is moving at or near the focus of SLM R344 BOP. This location falls into the area of terminal control area of Thessaloniki. which extends in the direction to 38 DME SLM.

At the same time, it was thought that the aircraft is safe from ground obstacles, because the location of 28 DME SLM on radials 344 SLM BOP is within the prescribed minimum safe altitude (25 DME from micro / BOP 29 DME from SLM / BOP), as well as except that the second is inside the buffer zone around the driven directories flight procedures in the northern zone of expectations.

The reasons why the crew did not declare an emergency, remain unknown and devoid of logical explanation.