The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.



NEWSLETTER OF accidents involving aircraft Yak-42 UR42334 LVIV aviation enterprises. Flying AEW-241 on the route Odessa - Thessaloniki 17.12.97


  1. Full information about the vessel
  2. Information about downloading and ship the balance
  3. Information on meteorological conditions Airport "Macedonia" 
  4. Information about the location and the very clash
  5. Place the debris and factors vizhivaemosti
  6. Analysis: General Crash Considerations
  7. Overview of confusion in the cockpit
  8. The study of the effectiveness of the Manager
  9. Basic facts about the crash of the Yak-42
  10. The main causes of the disaster


Aircraft UR-42334. flying AEW-241. the operating organization - Ukrainian Airlines "AEROSVIT", on a regular scheduled flight from Odessa International Airport. Ukraine, to the international airport Salon" Macedonia ", Greece, came to land on runway 16 according to the VOR / ILS procedure (VHF omnidirectional radio beacon / instrument landing system). the second circle flight, due to the absence of this runway in the field of view, with a deviation from the intended trajectory, crashed in mountainous terrain, which led to the death of all on board and the complete destruction of the aircraft.


Factual information


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In I9: I2 *: 43 "XIV (coordinated universal time) 17 December 1997 flight AEW-241, carried out by the Ukrainian airline AEROSVIT, aircraft Yak-42, on a regular passenger flight on schedule from the International Airport Odessa to the International The port "Macedonia", Greece, which passed at night according to the instrument flight rules (PX1P), crashed in a mountainous area.AEW-24I made VOR-DME (equipment) the second landing on the 16 runway, but deviated significantly from the scheme Second cool in instrument The location of the incident was near the city, 37 nautical miles southwest of the airport of Thessaloniki.

The aircraft experienced a collision at an altitude of 3 300 S.U.M.1 feet near the summit ("The thread towers") in the course of 290 °. 20 ° right turn at a position with a raised part of the aircraft on 15-20 °, an indicated airspeed 0,347 Staha (216 minds. 400 km / h) "The aircraft was completely destroyed, and all crew members (X) and passenger (62 ) received fatal injuries.

IAC / LSF also gave AHW-24I instructions permitted the northern border in the waiting area and pointed out the approach sequence, in which the AEW-24I was number two on the route of arrival Lamba 1F and approach, VOR-DME, ILS to runway 16 ( Appendix 12). Messaging occurs in normal mode up to the area of ​​Lambi. In the future, however, the lack of understanding of the flock grow, n connection with the cabin crew, as well as management, have been violated.

The flight did not follow the "arc" of the trajectory of the LUMBY 1F (see Appendix 4) according to and not the ATC drone (air traffic control), instead he lay down on the THOLKS / THROTTLE (THS / NDB) course, as indicated in yellow in Appendix I. As a result of this deviation, the alarm signal (1: 18: 47 "and 24: 18: 49") was issued twice to the crew, and the crew did not react to any alarm except for the comment on the mountains in the first case.The aircraft made a flight over the radio beacon, At least twice in an attempt to install on the course for the sake of However, having failed to follow the written instructions for moving to the course and capturing the beacon (using the "arc" and with the necessary rapid reduction), the flight crew could not establish a stabilized approach.

As a result, the AEW-24I arrived at the airport's borders at too high an altitude and passed over the airport and the KRM recording shows that the crew did not even understand this due to loss of orientation.

Manager told them 18: 54 ': 37 ", that they have passed the airport. The negotiations of the crew inside the cabin show that they are disoriented, and experiencing confusion about the rate at which should continue the flight, n in 18: 55 they asked the IAC / ADP (aerodrome control tower) "rate". Manager replied that they were not heard and asked AEW-24I contact with the approach control frequency at 120.8. Changing the frequency has been confirmed by the flight crew.

As soon as the AEW-24I left the airport area, they have reported to date 150 * and noted the request of the Manager, their height 1500 feet "request dispatcher

information whether the AEW-24I south of Thessaloniki on the radiogram 150e. AEW-241 confirmed "radiograms /50°".MAK/11DH received the message and instructed the crew to continue to climb in the external circuit of the aerodrome to 6000 feet (pressure reduced to \ an equal Sea 1035). Resolution has been confirmed AEW-241 in 18: 56 ': 12 ". Further, the MAC / 11DH gave them instructions to stay in the south waiting area at an altitude of 6000 feet and continue on 150 from a zone of the outer contour of the airport with a climb up to 6000 feet. After that, IAC / LSF turned his attention to the flight O.EG. incoming and area of ​​the airport.

In 18: 57: 58 "IAC / LSF have AEW-241 continue to climb up to 6000 feet," Make flight right in the direction of the joint venture St / BOP ". AEW-241 confirmed this to specify the message" Rotate Right naprav.1enie servants. MRC showed that the confusion in the cockpit and on the continued loss of orientation question testified flight instructor (IL1) "where to go?" and dissatisfied replica flight engineer (B / E) "Do not cry '(KRM 46 with 18: 56': 46" for 18: 57: 35 "). IAC / LSF requested AEW-241 confirm the direction of SLM BOP (TSL = beacon Thessaloniki . SLM) at an altitude of 6000 feet, which was confirmed by the flight crew

LOGO It was after the time the crew attempted to tune in the VOR and continue to turn at CJ1M. The commander stated (ASO * 49 with 18: 58 ': 49 "for 18: 57: 19") - "So, what course to follow, look," the co-pilot (C / I) - "Right. He'll BOP" Commander (R) - "I set up ARGG '(ATM - Automatic Direction Finder), the flight instructor (I / P) -" to adjust the BOP. Take a course at the BOP, go to the thief, "Captain (R) -" For a thief? So on the left (tune? move?). "

Manager inquiry by AEW in I8: 59 ': 20 ". AEW said:" 6000-foot-five miles from the servants. IAC / LSF confirmed: "Roger, set gramophones at the station? Tell installed gramophones at the station?". AEW-241 said: "the establishment of radiogram." In 18: 59 *: 46 "IAC / LSF confirmed AEW-241" Keep 6000 feet "and instructed them to" report SLM / BOP '. AEW-241 said "Save 6000 feet, let servants.

After that, the cab was even more confused about the installation of the VOR. And the pilot instructor asked the question of the operability of the VOR signal. In 19: 00 ': 11, "one of the crew members said" Get off at 6000 feet, Lesha. "MAC / PDH again requested confirmation from AEW-24I that they support an altitude of 6000 feet and received an affirmative answer from the flight crew. However, the time of the KPM showed that they had not yet reached 6000 feet ("go to 6000, Lesha"). In 19: 00: 20 "MAC / PDH reported:" Hold 6000, 241 report MICRA VOR. " AEW-241 once again answered in the affirmative: "You understood, to inform St ICRAVOR ... AEW.In the cockpit the pilot-instructor (I / 11) immediately said" Please, pull it on ", and the commander (P) replied: I can not. "The flight parameters recorder showed that the flaps at that time were set at an angle of 20 ° and the flight continued in climb mode, but difficulties arose in achieving the required altitude

In 19: 00: 38 "to continue negotiations within the cockpit that the flight" was mostly busy setting and Decoder aviation equipment in the cockpit. 19: 01: 08 "IAC / LSF again made the request:

"AEW-241, passed you on the SLM in the direction MICRA Worth" AEW-24I replied that they "move toward a servant. In 19: 01: 34" appear VOR was set up and co-pilot said: "outer loop". In 19: 01: 52 "the commander said," Flaps on the remove 20 °. Keep them in position. "

The dispatcher requested the location of AEW-24I at 19:02 ": 19". and the flight crew replied: “Location ten miles from SLM. Dispatcher:“ Are you outside the outer boundary of SLM to the north? ”AEW-241 replied:“ Confirming. ”MACL1DH requested:“ Radiol 344 from station ”AEW-241 replied: "Radiol is not a complete answer to the dispatcher. After switching over to transmit the command to the domestic flight, the dispatcher at 19; 02 *: 56 "gave the command to AEW-24I" ... continue heading north, descend on a course north to 4500 feet, pressure normalized to sea level on a course north 1035 ", - In conversations inside the cockpit," Heading north, northern waiting wave "was repeated, and then AEW-24I replied to IAC / PDH:" We continue to move "northern waiting for me with a decrease of 4500, pressure 1035".

In 19: 03 ': 26 "IAC / I 1DH again requested AHW-24I. Whether they are north of the SLM AEW-241 said." Yes, to the north of the SLM. At the same time, the co-pilot in the cockpit said: 'He asks if we are to the north. " After receiving an affirmative response manager in 19: 03 ': 43 "made an indication:" AEW-241, you are squeezed, the continuing decline in 3500 foot pressure 1035 allowed VOR-DME-DL runway 16 inform establishing an J1J13 number one "( LLZ - ​​beacon). The crew replied: "Zanichayu 3500 1035 foot pressure notify interfacing LLZ runway 36 ... 16".

After this conversation the crew inside the cockpit radio frequencies concerned, heading, altitude and commented pilot instructor "So ... we go 270 °", and later this was confirmed by the second pilot, who stated: "The course 270 ° we go."

In 19; 05 ': 00 "the commander asked for pi lot instructor:" You, Alex, give him a course and altitude. "This was followed by further discussion in the cab'

C / P: * What is the ATM? "Does the radar?"

Commander: "Tell him ... tell him to vector."

/ P: "Does the ATM? This, this," "What's on the second (PRA)?"

B / E: "On the first ATM setup."

P / E: "What a setting on the second"

 "345 (SLM / ATM frequency). Yes, 240 ... 270“.

Commander: "You add (power)," C / P: "Speed, speed."

In 19: 05 ': 30 "the dispatcher asked again the position of AEW-241 and crew replied:" The situation is now ... 8 miles DME from the SLM. "Manager said:" Confirm your location to the north of the SLM 8DMET crew replied: "Done" . Then in 19: 05 ': 58 "Manager said:" 241 understand you continue to VOR-DME, ILS approach, let the installation due to the LLZ. " The crew replied: "Well, the establishment of LLZ runway 16".

In 19: 06 *: 12 "said Commander (MRC):" Stop. I do not understand what you choose? How do we follow the course? "

The co-pilot said: "Two seven-zero." The instructor said: * We are following. "The commander said again:" What do you choose? ". A flight instructor suggested:" Let's go, do a U-turn on 160.

At this point, the PFR revealed that the course was indeed 270e. The flight crew continued to comment on the height, speed and course and eventually the captain ordered the crew: "Request vectoring".

In 19: 07: 50 AEW-24I made a request: "Macedonia AEW-241, if possible ask for vectoring to the runway 16". Manager working with another domestic flight, and said: "AEI'-241 again?" The crew repeated "Please vectoring direction." Manager said: "There is no radar guidance. Sir, no. We can not, we can not provide radar vectors.

Perform BOP-DME-NLS approach to BIU1 16 ". AEW-24I replied" I confirm. "MLK / PCB gave the instruction:" Report reception of signal from LLZ RWY 16, 3500 feet. "To this the crew replied:" Understood, inform you LLZ ". This radio exchange with ATC, accompanied by discussions inside the cockpit of navigation problems, the operation of radio navigation equipment, determining the route they were on, etc. until 19:09": 38 ", when MLK / PCB again requested position AEW-24I. The crew replied: “Location ... 28 miles.” After that, the dispatcher asked: “Got it, AEW you will be able to perform VOR-DME-ILS approach 167. Inside the cockpit KRM registered comments:“ You will complete RWY 16T, “Well, where are we going ? ”Then the crew replied to the dispatcher: 'I understand you LEI MAK / PCB asked:“ AEW-241 are you familiar with the BOP-DME-NLS approach scheme? ”Replied:“ Now ... perform the VOR ... 3500 feet confirm? The dispatcher replied, 'Yes Sir, set the HUD reception at 3500 feet, then approach RWY 16 to the minimum, until the set about writing the minimum. " AEW-241 replied "Okay"

Between 19: 10 ': 38 "for 19: 10': 48" crew continued the discussion in the cockpit of the difficulties in navigation and orientation, and the instructor was made the remark: "Well, Alex, let's orient ourselves, we follow the outer contour of the locator on the rate 210 °, so where should locator? " The commander said: "It is back." An unidentified voice said, "... look at the scheme." The co-pilot said: "We must turn to the left." Then the conversation went about setting up an ATM and there was some confusion as to what ATM has been installed on 345 (Thessaloniki drive.) And what conclusion on the indicator.

In 19: 10 flight engineer (B / S) stated that the ATM is installed, and the co-pilot said, "including on the radar." Then the commander said, "Now, we do turn to the right, head for the radar." This was followed by: "Hey, let's go back to the original state flaps," "Let's increase the speed," "increases the speed, remove the flaps", and finally the co-pilot said: "flaps retracted".

In 19: 10: 58 IAC / PCB requested height AEW-241, but in the Greek language. AEW-241 said: "3500 feet '. Manager returned to radio traffic with the question: "Got it, you set the reception from the LLZ?" The immediate response from the crew are not followed, but inside the cabin copilot said, "Take it right," and the commander said, "Now take a right." After that AEW-241 manager said: "Turn right at the lighthouse.

In 19: 12: 08 "for 4 seconds will sound signal ZSPS. The instructor said," Turn the speed ... OK? ". The flight engineer said: "Normally".

At 19: 12 ': 13 "MAK / PHP made niton:" LEN' number one, continue VOR-DME-ILS approach to a minimum, continue and report approaching the outer marker. "The crew replied:" Report the outer marker. " After a while, the MAC / PCD asked the question: “AEW-241 do you see the field?” At this moment, the ZSPS signal sounded again, followed by the alarmed voices of those inside the cockpit: “Continue ascent, climb”, “The light on the panel ( signal) "Dangerous earth". “How long did you tell me to climb", “How long did you tell me to climb?" This was the last message on the KRM.

In 19: 12: 43 signal ZSPS disconnected. MAKPHD tried to call AEW-241 up to 19: 20: 19. By that time, we were made aware of the military radar and alerted search and rescue services.

Because of bad weather the crash of the aircraft was found three days later. It was in an unpopulated wooded and hilly terrain at an altitude of 3300 feet MSL


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