Plane Crash Gagarin part 2
Plane Crash Gagarin part 2

Plane Crash Gagarin part 2

The aircraft was 4-th preventive maintenance in the aircraft repair company Air Force, in the city of Chuguev a year before the disaster. A group of specialists was immediately sent there to remove the aircraft repair business and verify the completeness and quality of the technological operations, in accordance with the requirements of the current documentation. The group was instructed to find out if the balloon was tested and why it does not have a mark of the service of the Bolognadzor. All production documentation for the area of ​​crimping of cylinders was found and tested. It turned out that in these documents there is no information about the oxygen cylinder with the number in question, although it is indicated in the other documents (in the repair and on the airplane form).

It was found out that two persons were working at the area of ​​crimping of cylinders at that time. One of them is young, with work experience of about five years, and the second - an elderly man, as they say, an old aviator, taught life and war, on which he was an aircraft technician. On this site, he worked more than 15 years. When they were clarified the essence of the matter and asked to prove (to which there was no hope) or at least to recall whether the ill-fated oxygen cylinder was checked by the Kotlovadzor service a year ago, an elderly worker with trembling hands took two thick notebooks from the box of his workbench. There, according to an old aviation habit, he wrote down for years the numbers of those cylinders that he personally checked himself. The number of this cylinder and the date of its verification were recorded in the notebook. To put a mark on the balloon about its verification and to record the performed work in the technological map, he did not have time, because of the illness for more than two weeks, being on treatment. The young worker, believing that everything was decorated, passed this and other cylinders to the assembly shop for installation on the plane. Thus, the question of checking the balloon was removed.

Meanwhile, experts have completed the study on the cylinder holes. Crystallographic analysis of metal around the perimeter of the holes showed that the destructive forces acting inward cylinder and melt edges confirms the presence of oxygen in the cylinder pressure of about 130-140 kg / sm2. When the output of oxygen through the hole occurs brief but powerful effect of oxygen torch melted steel cylinder. On this basis it was concluded that the destruction of the cylinder comes from a collision with the ground plane.

The version about the collision of an airplane with a bird also arose not accidentally. At the site of the crash, fragments of birds were found, and a part of the bird carcass with traces of fresh blood was found among the wreckage of the aircraft at a distance of 90 m from the funnel. It should be noted that the temptation to write off the catastrophe for the "birdie" was clearly evident in some members of the State Commission, when it became clear that the true cause could not be established. Statistics show that the collision of aircraft with a bird rarely causes tragic consequences. A bird can enter the aircraft engine in its failure, but in this case the engine was operational.

The work was done in two ways. The first - the study of the remains of birds species of birds, belonging to one or fragments of different individuals, their way of life, flight altitude, time of death. And the second-set signs collision of birds and planes.

Research conducted engineers dvigatelisty Lavrik VS Shersher and EA, who by virtue of their performance deals with issues of failures of aircraft engines because of the ingress of birds and disposal organize materials on the subject.

Leading scientists-ornithologists of the Zoological Museum and experts of the KGB forensic laboratory were involved in the work on the first direction. Studies have established that at the furthest point from the funnel (see figure 1 item No. 4), two hundred meters to the right of the flight line, parts of the ham bone of the domestic chicken are found, apparently the remains of the hunter's food last fall. Somewhat closer to the funnel (see item No. 3), two faded and lost freshness of the pen of the left wing of the jay were found. Positions No. 1 and No. 2 designate the locations where the left wing and remains of the carcass with the right wing with traces of fresh blood were respectively found. A common effort of ornithologists and forensic scientists found that this jay was killed by a feathered predator in the early morning on the day of the disaster. This was seen: not a full stomach (it eats at the beginning of the day), straight sections of the remains of muscle tissue and traces of the claws of a predator on the plumage of wings and carcass. A conclusion was made about the natural eating of a jay by a goshawk: he held it with his paws, and tore it with his beak and ate it. Already from communication with ornithologists it became clear that a catastrophe can not be related to a collision with a bird. But that was not enough.

The second line of work on this version was purely engineering. In the entrance airway of the aircraft engine, traces of birds (blood, fluff, fat spots, parts of bones) were not detected. Therefore, special attention was paid to the study of the pilot's cockpit. It was necessary to determine when and from what forces the destruction of the lantern happened. To do this, it was necessary to find the maximum possible number of fragments of it and from them, as specialists say, "to stick out a flashlight". The work is very laborious, but feasible. The top layer, brought from the crash site, was just a day's work. Earth in the literal sense sifted to only shards of glazing, but also small parts and bolts, the presence and nature of the destruction of which were very important for the validity of the findings. Of the pieces collected at the site of fall, almost 1% of the glazing area of ​​the lantern was glued. From the experience of investigations it is known that when there is a collision with a bird on the glass, there necessarily remains blood and even fluff. There were no such signs on the lantern under examination. The lantern collapsed when the plane hit the ground, and not in flight. In another case, it would be impossible to collect and glue its glazing, practically in its entirety.

The failure of the version of the aircraft collision with a bird has been proven.

All the work of the subcommittee directed engineering to obtain maximum information on the status of the aircraft, conditions and parameters of its destruction at the point of collision with the ground. The high level of methodological support research emergency facilities, the availability of appropriate laboratory and experimental base, as well as experience and qualifications of staff of the Institute allowed to do so.

Engineering sub-commission has reached the following conclusions:

1. The UTI MiG-15 aircraft in flight, up to the moment of collision with the ground, was technically sound and efficient. There were no failures and malfunctions of his systems.

2. During the flight, the aircraft did not collide with another aircraft, a balloon or a bird. All the destruction of its structure, units and devices occurred from collisions with the ground.

3. Parameters and final flight conditions of the aircraft at the point of impact with the ground are presented.

The scheme of the final conditions of the flight of the aircraft requires explanations. The mismatch of the cutting angle of the trees (this is the direction of the motion of the center of mass of the aircraft) with the angle of inclination of the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, combined with the fact of the deviation of the elevator at 16-18 ° for calibration, gave grounds for believing that the aircraft was in dive-out mode at that moment. The angle a = 20 ° ± 3 °, of course, is perceived in this case as the angle of attack of the aircraft. Recall that the cutting angle of trees was adopted by the State Commission equal to 50 °, and the speed along this direction was obtained by calculation from the triangle of velocity vectors. Based on this speed and the angle of attack, the overload value was calculated. These design parameters are indicated on the diagram.

The speed of the aircraft along the longitudinal axis is not indicated and it can be explained by the following circumstances. The NUS-1200 indicators, which fix the speed along the longitudinal axis, were found and brought to the investigation as one of the last destroyed objects of the plane from the place of its fall. They were fixed speed 660-670 km / h. These estimates were obtained only after the final conditions were compiled in the form shown in Fig. 13, and accepted by the State Commission. By this time, the understanding of the final conditions of flight became generally accepted: the withdrawal of an aircraft from a dive. If we put the actually detected velocity along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, it does not agree with the design parameters for the conditions for the withdrawal of the aircraft from the dive. This calls into question the entire concept of the final flight conditions adopted by the commission. Confidence in the obviousness of withdrawal from the dive proved to be stronger than those doubts that arise when taking this speed into account. Therefore, it is not indicated in the diagram.

The State Commission has adopted this scheme, moving the plane from the point of impact with the ground in the middle of the chart. This is more clearly reflects the time taken by the character of the aircraft and an understanding of CSOs that in this area (by hitting the first tree to the ground) motion parameters have not changed.

Engineering subcommittee completed its task, but at the same time should pay attention to the fact that the results of investigations of some instruments in a number of subjective and objective reasons, have not been claimed for the recovery and analysis of the overall picture of the accident. Such devices a little.

About the Course Pointer UGC-1 from a set compass DGMK-3, as well as signs of ASC-1200 mentioned earlier. These should be added to the altimeter VD-20 and Index of height and pressure drop in the cabin UVPD-3, which should highlight.

On the altimeter at the point of collision between the aircraft and the ground, the shooter showed the remainder of the height of 200 m. Such cases are rather rare, but they already met during the investigation of disasters. This phenomenon was called the lag or delay of the altimeter readings from the true altitude. Even then it was understood that this instrumental-methodical error of the altimeter, which occurs at high vertical descent speed, but from what other parameters of the dive the delay depends, it was not known. An attempt was made to determine such an interconnection during the investigation of the aircraft of Yuri Gagarin and V. Seregin, but proved to be inconclusive.

It was also impossible to comprehend to the end the testimony of the UVDD-3. Two instruments are mounted in it: one is an altimeter that shows the height in the cockpit of the aircraft, the other shows the magnitude of the difference between the cabin pressure and the pressure in the static system of the aircraft's air pressure receiver, i.e., the barometric pressure over the side of the aircraft. The altimeter in the UVDD-3 had a backlog of 300 m, and the differential pressure needle moved to the negative range of the scale and showed the value "-0,01 kg / cm2". The damaged scales VD-20 and UVDD-3, as well as the reconstruction of the positions of their arrows on the scales of serviceable devices are presented.

To understand the indications of the UVDD-3, laboratory experiments and flight tests were carried out. Pilot-testers based on the LII them. M. Gromov conducted a series of dives from different heights on the UTI aircraft MiG-15. The report on these tests indicated that it was impossible to obtain the same indications for the UVDD-3, which were recorded during the crash of the plane of Yu. Gagarin and V. Seregin. And it was concluded that such readings "do not correspond to the mode of flight of an airplane with a normally sealed cabin". This conclusion makes it possible to understand the significance of the fact established in the study of the cranes for ventilation of the first and second cockpits of Yu. Gagarin and V. Seregin. The crane of the second cabin was completely closed, and the cock of the first cabin was open at 48%. The cross-section of the open throat of the crane was 5,28 cm2.

On the basis of these data it is possible to make a reasonable conclusion: semi-open ventilation valve of the first cabin from the beginning

flight provided both cabins venting to the atmosphere and, therefore, it was unsealed.

This conclusion, of course, could be made at a time when the investigation 1968 years, but the state commission considered the flight to an altitude of 4200 m nevysotnym, and information about the state of the cockpit of the aircraft of interest, apparently, had no idea.

Unfortunately, circumstances are such that then find out the testimony of the above devices and to respond to the arisen in connection with the issue failed. At the level of our knowledge 1968, some issues simply can not be solved. Over the years 35 extensive experience of emergency research facilities, new knowledge in the field, found solutions to similar problems. On this basis, it is now proved possible to do something that could not be implemented if and thereby achieve new knowledge about the crash. This will be discussed in the "Version".



Medical subcommittee worked on the basis of Research Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine. On the paper were attracted leading criminologists and scientists of the Academy of Medical Sciences.

Airport doctors are always involved in the investigation of accidents. They help engineers and pilots to more objectively assess the actions of the crew in an emergency, making conclusion on the health status and the degree of performance of pilots, defining the nature and strength of the possible consequences of the action of the various factors.

During the investigation of the crash of the subcommittee, in addition to the above, we have put a number of tasks. The country's leadership has demanded to provide input forensic examination and the results of special studies to objectively confirm that Yuri Gagarin was killed, and the State Commission required to determine which of the pilots flew the plane at the last moment.

Medical subcommittee was in an extremely complex and difficult situation. The bodies of the pilots were completely destroyed. Doctors with difficulty, but still find the necessary amount of biological material for research. It should be noted that the material fell into the hands of physicians only a day or more after the disaster, also in very small quantities. Therefore, several special studies including checking for adrenaline could not be performed.

The fact of the death of Yuri Gagarin was obvious to those who are in the early days of examining the site of the crash, and who then worked with his shattered nodes. Scraps of clothing were recognized by people close who knew Mr. Yu agarin. It was found his watch "Superavomatik" driver's license, tickets to a summer dining room, unopened pack of cigarettes, the remains of shoes Photo Korolev.

Left hand Gagarin was found on the throttle. From it managed to get fingerprints. They were compared with those who were found in the apartment of Yuri Gagarin on the telephone

apparatus on the glass of his desk in the office, on postal envelopes of personal correspondence. Coincidentally characteristic points of papillary patterns proved their identity.

An examination for the presence of alcohol in the muscle tissues of the pilots. It was found that more than 48 hours before the flight, they did not use alcohol.

The results of the above studies is checked by forensic laboratories of the Defense Ministry and the KGB.

The crew's well-being and working capacity did not cause doubts from take-off until the last radio exchange. This is confirmed by the results of the analysis of the timbre of the voice of Yuri Gagarin, who conducted radio communication with the RP. In the last conversation there was no emotional tension and anxious notes. And what happened next? For the last 70 seconds, the crew did not leave the connection, and the trajectory of the aircraft was unknown. There was only one possibility - to look for indirect signs about the state of the pilots in the wreckage of the aircraft at the time of its collision with the ground. In this case, the most informative signs are traces about the position of the hands and feet of the pilots.

On the handle control of the aircraft pilots traces of hands were found. We could not establish the position of the left hand Seregin and right hands of pilots. Only an analysis of shoe soles pilots gave reason to believe that Yuri Gagarin feet were on the pedals control rudder and Seregin legs were tightly pressed to the same dual control pedals during the second cockpit. This fact was established by matching the angles at which were destroyed sole shoes Seregin and pedals. The results of these studies are presented.

Two reliably established facts - the left hand of Yuri Gagarin on the ore and the feet of V. Seregin on the pedals - did not allow to make a confident conclusion about the crew's efficiency. The results of the engineering subcommittee gave the third, quite weighty, fact: the elevator was rejected by 16-18 ° for calibration, which was perceived as a consequence of the actions of the pilots. They also considered the manner of V. Seryogin's behavior as an instructor: he provided an opportunity for the auditee to freely control the aircraft and even removed his feet from the pedals. In this case, his feet were on the pedals. On the basis of all these facts, the medical subcommittee concluded that the crew was operational throughout the flight and at the last moment the aircraft was operated by V. Seregin.

A more complete features and the results of the medical subcommittee presented in the works of Doctor of Medical Sciences IM Alpatov. He personally participated in the study of the remains of Yuri Gagarin and Vladimir Seregin in 1968 year and pictures shown in Fig. 2, 3, 16 and 17, were published in his article in the magazine "Aviation and Space News» 1994 the city, as well as in the "aerospace almanac» № 3 (magazine "Aerospace and Environmental Medicine», 1999 city).



The composition of the flight of the subcommittee included the famous test pilots, leading aerodynamics, space pilots, flight service representatives OKB. Mikoyan, LII. Gromov, TsAGI, as well as specialists of military aviation academies. As part of the sub-commission was established a few groups that have worked in certain areas.

The Sub-Commission had to solve the following problems:

- to assess the level of training of Y. Gagarin and V. Seregin and the possibility of their fulfillment of the flight task in real conditions;

- to determine whether there were any shortcomings in the organization of management and flight support at the Chkalovsky airfield that day;

- to analyze the air situation on the route and flight of the aircraft of Y. Gagarin and V. Seregin;

- to obtain the initial data for determining the parameters of aircraft droppings in the emergency area.

The main aim of the work on the mentioned areas was to identify the facts and circumstances that could directly or indirectly affect the tragic outcome of the flight.

Sub-group identified two main deficiencies in the organization of the management and maintenance of flights:

1. On the day of the flights, the radar station, which was supposed to control the altitude of the aircraft in the zones, was not operational. Preventive work was carried out on it. The flight director monitored the air situation using a second radar, which provided information on the location of the aircraft, their course and flight speed. The screen of this radio locator was supposed to be photographed at regular intervals using special photo attachments, but they were turned on.

2. The time and sequence of aircraft take-off from the aerodrome established by the planned flight table were not exactly kept. First of all, this concerns a pair of MiG-21 aircraft, which took off 1-2 minutes after the 625th and another UTI MiG-15 aircraft with the call sign 614, which took off 4-5 minutes after Y. Gagarin and V. Seregin. According to the planned table, 614 was supposed to take off first, and then a pair of MiG-21s.

In the real and the possible consequences resulting from these drawbacks, it is necessary to stay especially.

The lack of information about the altitude of aircraft reduced the level of control over their work in the areas. First of all, it has complicated the work of the head of operations. So he did not understand what the maneuver began 625-minutes after the last radio became the height of his request.

The absence of photographs of the radar screen had the most serious consequences for the investigation. This meant that the minimum necessary, but extremely important information, authentically reflecting the points of the route and flight profile of Yu. Gagarin and V. Seregin in height, was lost irrevocably. The route and flight profile were obtained by calculation on the basis of flight crew data, as well as data from the radio exchange, the tape record of which was available. They are presented in Fig. 18 and 19. These graphs, as well as the diagrams in Fig. 20 was made by SM Belotserkovsky and was first published by him in his works in 1988.

Belated 614-off was seen as a breach of taking into account possible negative effects that could occur with a rather rare combination of conditions and circumstances of the flight of the aircraft. Flight 614-th shown in Fig. 19.

In its zone number 21 he had to work at a height 3000 m. In theory, a dangerous convergence of aircraft could have happened after the last radio 625-go with RP. The plane of Yuri Gagarin and Vladimir Seregin to perform two turns ("Eight") spent a little more than 4-minutes. He seemed to have stayed in place. During this time, 614-th could catch up and overtake him. Schemes reflecting the process and the relative position of the aircraft in the air, are presented.

However, for airplanes first and 614-625-th dangerously closer, they should be reduced not only at the rate and time, but also in height. This situation is possible under the condition that both crew simultaneously or one of them were to grossly violate flight rules in their areas by changing their assigned altitude. The probability of such an event is very small, but it was supposed to and analyzed by experts of the subcommittee.

At the same time estimated the total air situation in the area. A pair of MiG-21 was at that time at the height of 5000 m and could not interfere with 625-th. Su-11, carrying out a test flight, took the Chkalovsky airfield area at this time at the height of 11000 m. On board there was equipment, which recorded flight parameters. Films from these records have been requested and analyzed by experts of security operations chief of the Air Staff. It was found that the aerodrome Chkalovsky Su-11 11000 m below the height did not go down.

Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor SM Belotserkovsky took a direct part in the consideration of these issues as a member of the working group of the flying subcommittee. He was a staunch supporter of the version that 625 got into the wake of the 614-th, and this was the primary reason for the development of the emergency situation for the aircraft of Yuri Gagarin and V. Seryogin. The schemes shown in Fig. 18-20, are taken from the works [1, 2, 3] of SM Belotserkovsky, where he substantiates the possibility of dangerous approaching of aircraft and the trajectory of 625-go on the emergency section of the flight. During the investigation, the subcommission did not find reliable data confirming the assumptions of SM Belotserkovsky. They were recognized as probable, but no more.

Weather conditions and the forecast of their changes were analyzed carefully. It was found that the summary of meteorological mostly correctly reflects the actual weather conditions along the route and in the area of ​​flight. Forecast changes in weather conditions and the information received from the plane - weather reconnaissance, were brought to the pilots in the pre-flight instructions. It was assumed that the weather will get worse, and the lower edge of the lower cloud cover can fall from a height of up to 900 600 m m. Set the real height of the lower edge of the cloud to the crash site did not succeed.

At the lower edge of the cloudiness is lowered to an altitude of 300 m. These are the data of SM Belotserkovsky, which were obtained by him after the investigation was completed. To believe that this was not the case, but it is already impossible to verify this. At the same time, many, including aviation specialists, use this data as evidence of the fault of the meteorological service. The logic of the reasoning is this: the pilots knew that the edge was at an altitude of 600-900 m, went under it to make a maneuver to the conclusion within the line of sight of the ground, but there was no more stock of altitude. For the sake of objectivity, let us note whether the meteorological service can give an accurate forecast of the height of the cloud's lower edge in the unpredictable point of the zone in which the aircraft was to operate at an altitude of 4200 m? And again: what is the basis for the statement that the crew had to descend to the lower edge and go out to the height of the line of sight of the earth?

The Sub-Commission concluded that weather conditions have allowed the crew to successfully complete the flight mission.

Evaluation of the flight crew training level and its ability to fill the flight task in actual conditions is an obligatory and far from simple part of the investigation of crash incidents. Statistics show that the cause of more than 85% of disasters is, as it is customary to say, the human factor. In this case, when drawing up, of course, an objective conclusion, it was necessary to take into account the professional and ethical aspect. After all, two Heroes of the Soviet Union and, in fact, both testers were killed. V. Seregin carried out the construction of more than 70 types of aircraft. He often popped II and difficult situations, but successfully coped with them, and his level is 1X1. Professional training did not cause doubts. Yuri Gagarin was also a tester, but the first space technology.

And the big break in the summer internship related to social and political activities of Yuri Gagarin, of course roish lowered its preparation. Training flights he Way to perform from February 1968 years were intended to restore lost to return to flight operations. He carried out a special program for commissioning of punctuality, honesty and disciplined. His plaque at this time was more than 7 hours.

Information available to the subcommittee confirms that to the point of the last radio flight took place normally. It was necessary to understand why the crew by doing just one exercise, ahead of queries at the airport. By fuel, they could fly more 20 minutes. And it is equally important to understand why Gagarin and Seregin did not report the cause of the Republic of Poland of its decision to terminate the flight.

Flight subcommittee was forced to search for answers to these questions in a logical way, based on practice and psychological features of Action pilots in emergency situations. It is considering several options for the termination of the assignment:

a) the crew had the right to do so. The decision was made by agreement for some reason known only to the pilots, about which there was no need to report to the RP;

b) they knew about the forecast of deteriorating weather and decided to return to the airfield in order to have time to carry out another, already independent, flight on the MiG-17 planned for Yuri Gagarin. V. Seregin had to give permission after completing this training flight. It was also unnecessary to report this to the RP;

c) a situation arose on board that required the termination of the mission and return to the airfield, but, in the opinion of the pilots, did not pose a danger to the flight back. Therefore, they decided not to report this to the RP;

d) an emergency occurred unexpectedly. The actions of the pilots were aimed at preventing its dangerous consequences and in this case they were not up to the RP report.

Flight subcommittee does not have information that could directly confirm or deny the above options. The results of engineering and medical subcommittees, indirect evidence in favor of variant d). It is this vision of action pilots was preferred.

In naturally occurring questions about the root cause, the conditions and the nature of the operating forces that could create an emergency situation, it is quite logical answer version of the hit aircraft Yuri Gagarin and Vladimir Seregin in the slipstream 614-th. Everything seems to converge, but the course of events in such a scenario was probabilistic. Acknowledge the reality of this event can the trajectory of the plane on the emergency site, but its parameters were not known.

In such cases, when there is no specific, clearly comprehensible information is tempting to attribute it to the pilots. The Sub-Commission did not go on this way. In its conclusion it stated that the level of flight crew training provided an opportunity to the successful implementation of the flight mission in the actual prevailing weather conditions and the impact of the facts of the situation on the air plane flight have been identified.

The results of the flight subcommittee, were very important to fully understanding the overall picture of the accident. However, they, like the results of the engineering and medical subcommittees, did not answer the main question of the investigation: the reason for the disaster. Fatal facts and circumstances, points directly to the cause, none of the sub-commission has not identified

All these results were obtained in the sub-committees by the end of May. When this was reported to the chairman of the State Commission Marshal Ustinov, it is in the hearts cried out: "So, they are hit by evil spirits? Here's another three months, but that the cause has been found! "

The verification and rechecking of all the obtained results and materials began. Various versions have been put forward, tested, and rejected. To determine the trajectory of the aircraft in the emergency phase of its flight, a special working group was created, consisting of specialists from the flight and engineering subcommittees. The group was forced to work on assumptions about the root cause and essence of the emergency, about the actions of the pilots and about the nature of the trajectory, since there was very little reliable initial data about all this.

Flying at an altitude of 4200 m at the rate of MK = 70 ° plane UTI

MiG-15 with two additional outboard tanks, taking into account its aerodynamic characteristics, it was necessary to bring for 70 ± 5 seconds to the point of collision with the ground with the parameters indicated in Fig. 13. This task had to be solved by this working group. She had the latest methods of aerodynamic calculations and the most modern at that time electronic computing equipment. Several tens of variants of the trajectory were calculated and analyzed. All of them were possible, but it was not possible to determine which of them best corresponded to the one that actually happened.

From this array of options the State Commission chose two, in her opinion, the most likely option. The decision of the State Commission to consider two options indicates that she did not have consensus on this process. Of course, the choice of options taken into account the results of studies of all subcommittees. However, it is very important trajectory should match the natural logic of the pilots in the current emergency.

It is known that the trajectory of the aircraft on the emergency site reflects the actions of the pilots, which, in turn, are determined by the development of the emergency situation. Between these three components (trajectory, actions and situation) of a single process, there is a stable relationship. The availability of reliable information on at least one component makes it possible to judge with greater certainty the nature of the entire process. Such information was not available to the State Commission. I had to build a trajectory for a version that by the end of the investigation became generally accepted, although it was not possible to back it up with a full evidence base. Based on the assumption of a dangerous rapprochement of aircraft. Note that SM Belotserkovsky, who adhered to this point of view, took an active part in the development of variants of trajectories. Accepting these variants of trajectories, the State Commission proceeded, apparently, from the following considerations.

The final conditions of the flight was the conclusion of a dive. The grounds were an engineering subcommittee.

Prior to that, the aircraft was in a spin. The crew turned the aircraft into a dive from a spin just before the upper edge of the lower clouds. Dive continued to come under a cloud and within sight, start maneuvering to exit in level flight. This assumption is made on the basis of practical experience of pilots who fell in similar conditions.

The initial phase of the trajectory, according to the State Commission, could be different in character as a movement, and for the reason that caused the emergency.

Under the root cause of the State Commission understands not only the possibility of getting the plane in slipstream 614-go, but the case of dangerous rapprochement with the foreign object without any direct contact with him. The implication was that it could be another aircraft, balloon, or even an imaginary obstacle formed by ragged clouds form. Pilots know that the clouds are not uncommon bizarre formations that can be seen as illusory foreign objects.

Fact dangerous approach is extremely difficult to prove and is almost impossible to refute. The state commission did not emphasize the attention on it, but still meant it along with others.

Not having reliable data on the original cause leading to an emergency, we had to focus on a dangerous rapprochement with the obstacle: the crew, trying to avoid a collision, brought the aircraft to the overcritical angles of attack, which led to its falling into a tailspin. This could happen at a height of 4200 m, immediately after the last radio exchange, and then the "Corkscrew" option appears. In another version, the "Virage-spiral", the airplane's falling into a tailspin for similar reasons was assumed at altitudes of 2000-3000 m. The State Commission did not provide the justification for the need to maneuver 625 for a decrease, but with this variant of traffic, the probability of its meeting with 614 , Which worked at an altitude of 3000 m.

The trajectories of the aircraft at the emergency site, taken by the State Commission, raised a number of questions. Due to the fact that these trajectories are built on assumptions and are probabilistic in nature, the answers can be very different, but also, unfortunately, possible. All the efforts of the State Commission of experts to find the facts and circumstances to confirm these paths were not successful.

Here it is appropriate to bring the case from the work of the engineering subcommittee. Specialists brought a radio receiver from the UTI MiG-15. It was said that he was found a few kilometers from the place where the plane fell, Yuri Gagarin and V. Seregin. The hatch was deformed, but the fastening screws remained on it. By plane it is located in the upper bow of the fuselage right in front of the windshield of the cockpit of the first pilot. Such a finding gave rise to serious assumptions: the hatch was not fixed as it should be and in the flight it was ripped off by an air stream. The pilot, of course, took the hatch that flashed before his eyes like a foreign object and, naturally, began a sharp maneuver to avoid collision with possible other objects - and the plane falls into a tailspin. There is a real root cause! We started to check.

The nose of the aircraft was destroyed greatly. We have already noted that a portion of the top layer of the earth was brought together with small fragments of the aircraft. I had to sift through the earth to find a nut fixed on the Structures, to be screwed into the screw fastening flap. If they are without screws found flap owned aircraft investigated and the assumption is proved.

They found not only nuts, which are screwed screws fastening flap, but also pieces of the flap, comprising more than 60% of its area. Who found and brought this unfortunate flap remains unknown, but what happened, happened.

Thus, the investigation is completed. The final result of the work of the State Commission can be considered two schemes:

a) the final flight conditions of the aircraft by Y. Gagarin and V. Sere


b) options for the trajectory of the aircraft in the emergency phase of the flight.

At the last meeting in August 18 1968, the State Committee adopted an opinion. Original of this conclusion, few people know, but its meaning is known. It can be formulated as follows: the crew, due to changes in air situation, made a sharp maneuver, in which the aircraft was in a tailspin and the derivation from it in bad weather, he collided with the ground. The plane crashed, the crew perished.

Reports on the work of sub-committees to set out all of their results are still kept in the Military Research Institute, which hosted the subcommittee. A summary report on the work of the mission is in Gosko- unit Chief of the Air Staff.

After the end of the investigation decision of the Air Force Command SRI Erato all airplane parts Gagarin and Vladimir Seregin were left in storage. For their savings specifically designed preservative composition. They are stacked in the container hermetically sealed, welded and are stored in one of the laboratories of the Institute.

This is done in the hope that in the near or distant future, experts on the basis of new knowledge, methods and means of research, using the results and the materials preserved, still be able to establish the true cause of the disaster.

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