Key facts about the crash of the Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.
Key facts about the crash of the Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

Basic facts about the crash of the Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.



1. The aircraft was received by the airline "Aerosvit"At the Lviv State Aircraft enterprise for regular flights.

2. The flight crew passed the appropriate by the authorized bodies of Ukraine.

3. The flight crew had more than 24 hours of rest before reporting readiness and were on duty for 8:03 'hours prior to the incident.

4. None of the entire crew had previous experience of working at Macedonia Airport.

5. The flight was sent from Odessa with the VHF / NAV receiver inoperative, which contradicted the minimum equipment list (MOP).

6. There were four additional passengers on board. They were not listed in the passenger manifest and were not included in the load and balance schedule.

7. Weather conditions at Macedonia Airport were above the required minimum for approach and landing, but darkness and heavy cloud cover made it impossible to see the area as mountainous.

8. There is no evidence of any briefing or use of checklists in the AEW-241 cockpit during the descent and approach at Macedonia Airport as the last 30 minutes were recorded on the CRM.

9. The flight received a command from the IAC / PDH from the LAMBI 1F standard approach procedure (STAR) and was cleared to conduct a VOR-DME-ILS runway approach.

The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

10. The aircraft failed to comply with the movement of "DME arc 19" as stipulated procedure approach "STAR" Lambo 1F. Instead, he began to drive traffic directly to Thessaloniki (THS / NDB).

11. At the airport "Macedonia" is not installed radar approach control.

Approach procedures for the airport incorrectly indicates the presence of a radar approach control without specifying that the radar is a military target, and they could be used only at the request of Mr event of an emergency. AIS Greece clearly indicates that the military radar service is provided only on request (SERVICE TUC.RIT)

12. The plane flew over the course of the beacon at least twice, and the flight crew was not able to fulfill the established approach.

13. According to the negotiations in the cockpit, recorded on the MRC. vehicle-year-old go lei and confused and was not stubborn claim anionic our tools and information tools.

14. The flight crew did on standard calls regarding the glide path and low on approach.

15. The flight crew had no idea that they flew the runway until the moment when a tower received information that they passed over the airport.

16. The flight crew started to carry out the second round, but he did not follow the published procedure handbooks missed as the team failed to comply, given to him by ATC.

17. Although both teams had been received from the Department of Internal Affairs of the motion and the southern entrance to the waiting area, the flight continued to move along the flight path west

18. Conversations in the cockpit, registered in the MRC. They show that the flight crew remained in a state of confusion, disorganization and disorientation during the second round, and in the preparation of subsequent permits issued by the police department. They lost control of the situation and terrain, and they experienced uncertainty means of radio navigation and information that is displayed on them. They are also twice requested "vectoring" and "course", although the airport "Macedonia" does not apply to aerodromes with radar equipment.

19. Maybe the flight crew was under the impression that the radar is installed, as was incorrectly stated in the scheme Yeopessna on landing.

20. The flight crew was aware that they move west course.

21. Most of the time, the flight crew was worried about setting / ATM testimony than information about SLM / BOP, which underpins the process of the missed approach.

22. Periodically, the crew incorrectly read and gave information about the true distance of their distance measuring (DME) equipment (kilometers instead of miles and vice versa). This, together with the certificates of paragraph 1.16.10 confirms the impression that the source of the above indications the distance was. inappropriate for international flights distance measuring equipment (D.M.E.).

23. The flight crew in an attempt to solve navigation problems often switched their attention and information BOP / DME to ATM and vice versa. This coupled with the failure of the receiver № 1 VHF / NAV significantly affected the state of confusion in the cockpit and disorientation.

24. The flight crew did not declare an emergency condition, as well as in any of their messages, they do not specify that they can not execute commands and permits issued by the police department.

25. The cabin was not the man who gave the orders. The contribution of private pilot instructor, and the overall operation of the flight crew cabin n most of the time was negative.

26. Air traffic controllers airport "Macedonia" acting in accordance with the international rules laid down in Annex II and the PANS-RAC. In radio traffic were missing. However, they beat irrelevant and did not affect the chain of events leading to the accident.

27. The first contact between the AEW-241 and dispatching service "Macedonia" is not announced if they have information ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service in the terminal area), as well as the manager does not request confirmation of receipt of the ATIS information.

28. Incorrect reading of the pressure QNH (in 18: 56 ': 12 "), which was not recorded by the dispatcher approach, a few seconds later it was corrected by the flight crew.

29. Air traffic controllers "Macedonia" relied on the reports of the location (most of the time wrong) received from the crew as they performed in the absence of ATC radar equipment.

30. ATC "Macedonia" has made considerable efforts to assist the AEW-241 within existing national and international standards, however, the flight crew did not respond to it the way you'd expect from airline pilots. From 91 announcement by ATC. 63-63,9% were addressed AEW- 241. while 28-30.7% refers to the five (5) other aircraft that were in the same period in the area of ​​TMA (terminal control point) "of Macedonia *.

31. The flight requested "vectoring" twice (at 1 & 55 ': 03 "and 19: 08': 03"), which the approach controller and shift officer would have to interpret as radar service. Both of them did not sufficiently appreciate the severity of the situation in the cockpit, did not show their own initiative and did not offer the help of military radar. The controller's assessment of the situation was largely constrained by the crew's inexplicable insistence on what they were capable of following ATC commands and clearances. instead of declaring an emergency.

32. Before the collision any breakages and malfunctions of the aircraft, its systems and instruments except breakage VHF / HAB were not detected.

34. It was not found evidence of external radio-magnetic interference when the radio navigation aids and instruments of the aircraft.

35. There was no evidence that the installation in the aircraft panel between the People's flight was authorized by the manufacturer.

36. The Board of Inquiry has asked the representatives of Ukraine accredited to a number of documents related to the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft (for example, the last evidence of maintenance work, a copy of the form with the permission of the aircraft for the flight), but these documents were not provided.

Accredited representative of the Ukrainian declaration has been made in return of these documents. but the content of the statement does not reflect the actual facts

37. Procedures related to the flight, were not performed properly * The investigation revealed the existence of differences between the actual number of passengers on the Borg and the number of documents (four additional passengers), however, this should be the subject of further investigation by the relevant authorities

38. Unable to establish how many crew members were in the cockpit during a flight emergency, how many of them were sitting, and where they were sitting.

39. In response to the last two alarm ZSPS commander failed to comply with the maximum possible climb. If he had taken the correct maneuver when triggering alarm in 19: 12: 08. he would probably be able to cross the mountains.


  1. Full information about the vessel
  2. Information about downloading and ship the balance
  3. Information on meteorological conditions Airport "Macedonia" 
  4. Information about the location and the very clash
  5. Place the debris and factors vizhivaemosti
  6. Analysis: General Crash Considerations
  7. Overview of confusion in the cockpit
  8. The study of the effectiveness of the Manager
  9. Basic facts about the crash of the Yak-42
  10. The main causes of the disaster


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