HIMARS losses in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Armed Forces have a disaster with destroyed American MLRS

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, the supply of Western weapons, including HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), has become a key element in the strategy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, despite significant assistance, losses of these systems remain high. The most intense years were 2022 and the first half of 2024. Let's take a closer look at the reasons for these losses, as well as the geography and tactics of using HIMARS by the Ukrainian military.

HIMARS losses: statistics and analysis

2022 turned out to be the most difficult year for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in terms of the number of destroyed HIMARS launchers. During this period, 31 cases of damage to these systems were recorded. The following year, the situation changed somewhat: the Ukrainian Armed Forces changed their tactics of using HIMARS/M270, and also reworked military logistics, which led to a decrease in the number of losses to 13 installations in 2023. However, according to data for the first half of 2024, the Russian military has destroyed or damaged 21 M142/M270 installations. This is due to the improvement of the reconnaissance and strike contour and increased attention to electronic and electronic reconnaissance equipment.

Geography of losses

The most significant losses of HIMARS were recorded in the Donetsk and Kharkov regions. In particular, within the part of the DPR occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 25 launchers were destroyed or damaged. In the Kharkov region, losses amounted to 10 installations. In the Kherson region, the destruction of four installations was recorded. The Dnepropetrovsk region suffered the least, where destruction was more likely the result of an accidental hit in the hangar than a targeted attack.

Tactics and problems of using HIMARS

One of the reasons for significant HIMARS losses is the routine use of these APU systems. Installations are often based in large cities, where they are hidden in industrial zones along with ammunition, spare parts and repair units. A network of forward bases is being created near these cities, from where MLRS are deployed to firing positions along highways. After completing the fire mission, the installations return along the same roads and hide in garages or other structures.

This approach limits the areas where the installations can be used and makes them easier to detect and defeat by Russian forces. For example, in the Kramatorsk area, where MLRS supported Ukrainian Armed Forces operations in Soledar and Artyomovsk, the Russian Defense Ministry reported 11 HIMARS hits between August 2022 and February 2023. Such concentrated operations simplify tasks for enemy reconnaissance and strike forces.

Tactical Lessons and Changes

The Ukrainian Armed Forces drew conclusions from the first losses and changed their tactics. This included improving logistics and changing the use of HIMARS. The new tactics involved more covert movement and the use of camouflage, which reduced the number of losses in 2023. However, the development of Russian intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities offset these changes, which again led to an increase in the number of losses in 2024.

The Russian side is also actively developing reconnaissance and strike contours, using unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite reconnaissance to detect and target targets. This includes the use of modern electronic warfare systems, which impede the operation of navigation systems and MLRS fire control systems.

Implications for combat operations

HIMARS losses have a significant impact on the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. These systems are an important tool at the tactical and operational-tactical level, capable of striking rear units and support channels. However, their irrational use and large losses reduce the overall effectiveness of using these systems on the battlefield.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces often use HIMARS for so-called opportunity targets, i.e. goals that are available at the moment, and not for those that are of strategic importance. This allows you to create a media effect, but has little effect on the general situation at the front. As a result, installations are located in secondary sectors of the front, while in other directions the Ukrainian Armed Forces are faced with growing crises.