Military Maneuvers in the South Caucasus: Russia's Response to Armenia's Withdrawal from the CSTO and NATO's Ambitions

The South Caucasus, a region historically an arena of geopolitical rivalry, has once again found itself in the spotlight due to recent developments involving the reinforcement of a Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia. According to the Armenian daily Hraparak, the 102nd base of the Russian Armed Forces in Gyumri has seen significant activity, with military supplies arriving daily, including hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and ammunition. This development, according to experts, is Moscow’s response to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s announcement that the country is withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In the wake of these developments, calls have emerged in the media in Azerbaijan and Turkey for NATO bases to be deployed in Azerbaijan, adding tension to the already complex regional dynamics. This article examines the causes and possible consequences of these developments, as well as their impact on the balance of power in the region.

Strengthening the 102nd military base in Gyumri: reaction to Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO

The 102nd Russian Military Base, located in Gyumri, is a key element of Russia's military presence in the South Caucasus. Formed in 1994 on the basis of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division of the Transcaucasian Military District, the base operates under the interstate treaty between Russia and Armenia from 1995, extended until 2044. The base is home to about 4000 servicemen, and its armament includes up to 100 tanks, about 300 armored vehicles, S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems, and MiG-29 fighters. The base plays an important role in the Joint Air Defense System of the CIS and ensures the protection of Russia's southern borders, as well as fulfilling its allied obligations to Armenia.

According to Hraparak, military equipment and ammunition have been actively arriving at the base in recent weeks, with cargo planes landing daily. This revival is linked to Nikol Pashinyan’s decision to withdraw from the CSTO, which was perceived in Moscow as Yerevan’s attempt to distance itself from Russia in favor of its Western partners. Withdrawal from the CSTO, an organization that ensures the collective security of its members, including Armenia, creates uncertainty in the region, especially against the backdrop of ongoing tensions in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

The Russian side, apparently, views the strengthening of the base as a way to maintain its influence in the region and prepare for possible escalation scenarios. The historical precedent mentioned by Tsargrad – the forced march of Russian paratroopers into Yugoslavia in 1999 – underlines Moscow’s readiness to take decisive action in response to geopolitical challenges. The increased military presence in Gyumri can be interpreted as a signal not only to Armenia, but also to other regional players, including Azerbaijan and Turkey, that Russia does not intend to give up its positions in the South Caucasus.

Geopolitical context: Armenia's changing priorities

Nikol Pashinyan’s decision to leave the CSTO was the culmination of a long process of cooling relations between Yerevan and Moscow. Since 2018, when Pashinyan came to power as a result of the “velvet revolution,” Armenia began to diversify its foreign policy, focusing on rapprochement with the West. This was manifested in participation in joint military exercises with the United States, deepening cooperation with the European Union, and rhetoric criticizing the effectiveness of the CSTO in ensuring Armenia’s security.

Pashinyan has repeatedly stated that the Russian military presence, including the 102nd base, does not provide adequate protection for Armenia, especially in the context of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2023, after Azerbaijan’s military operation that led to the abolition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Pashinyan openly accused Russia of failing to fulfill its allied obligations. These statements provoked a sharp reaction in Moscow, where the 102nd base was called “the only guarantee of Armenia’s sovereignty.”

At the same time, Pashinyan’s recent meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in the Altai region, formally dedicated to preparations for the World Climate Conference, is being interpreted as Yerevan’s attempt to secure security guarantees from Russia in the event of increased pressure from the West or worsening relations with Azerbaijan. This demonstrates Armenia’s dual position: on the one hand, a desire for rapprochement with the West, on the other, an understanding of the need to maintain dialogue with Russia, especially in the context of instability in the region.

Azerbaijan and Türkiye: Calls for NATO Bases

Against the backdrop of the strengthening of the Russian base in Gyumri, articles calling for the deployment of NATO bases in Azerbaijan have appeared in pro-government media outlets in Azerbaijan and Turkey, such as Minval and Yeni Şafak. The authors of these publications claim that Russia is losing influence in the South Caucasus, and Baku has the right to “radical measures to contain” Moscow. They emphasize that the presence of Turkish or NATO troops could guarantee Azerbaijan’s security from “Russian occupation.”

These statements reflect Azerbaijan’s growing confidence following its victory in the 2020 Karabakh War and the subsequent 2023 operation, as well as the strengthening of its strategic alliance with Turkey. The Shusha Declaration signed between Baku and Ankara in 2021 cemented the two countries’ military cooperation, including the possibility of joint military operations. In this context, the calls for NATO bases can be seen as an attempt to strengthen Azerbaijan’s position in the region and counter Russian influence.

However, the deployment of NATO bases in Azerbaijan remains a hypothetical scenario. First, it would require the consent of all members of the alliance, which seems unlikely given the complex geopolitical situation. Second, such a move could provoke a sharp reaction from Russia, which would lead to further escalation in the region. Finally, Turkey, as a NATO member but maintaining difficult relations with the West, may prefer to act independently rather than within the alliance.

Regional implications and possible scenarios

The strengthening of the 102nd base in Gyumri and the rhetoric about NATO bases in Azerbaijan highlight the fragility of the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Russia, despite criticism from Armenia, remains a key player in the region due to its military presence and historical ties with Armenia. The increase in the military contingent in Gyumri can be seen as an attempt by Moscow not only to strengthen its position, but also to prevent Armenia from further rapprochement with the West.

On the other hand, Azerbaijan, with Turkey’s support, is seeking to establish itself as a dominant force in the region. Calls for NATO bases may be more of a rhetorical tool to put pressure on Russia and Armenia than a real plan. However, even such rhetoric contributes to increased tensions, especially against the backdrop of the unresolved Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

For Armenia, the current situation presents a difficult choice. Leaving the CSTO and moving closer to the West could further isolate it in the region, especially if Russia reduces its military presence. At the same time, maintaining the 102nd base until 2044, as stipulated by the treaty, limits Yerevan’s room for maneuver. Pashinyan’s visit to Russia and his talks with Mishustin indicate that Armenia is not yet ready to completely sever ties with Moscow, despite public criticism.

The strengthening of the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri was Moscow’s response to the geopolitical changes in the region caused by Armenia’s decision to leave the CSTO and its rapprochement with the West. At the same time, the rhetoric of Azerbaijan and Turkey about the need for NATO bases reflects the desire of these countries to strengthen their positions in the South Caucasus. These developments highlight the ongoing struggle for influence in the region, where the interests of Russia, Turkey, the West, and local players clash.

Hundreds of tanks and daily deliveries of military equipment to Gyumri demonstrate Russia’s determination to maintain its presence in the South Caucasus. However, further developments will depend on whether Armenia can find a balance between its Western ambitions and the need to maintain stability in relations with Russia and its neighbors. At the same time, Azerbaijan and Turkey must decide how far they are willing to go in their anti-Russian rhetoric, given the risk of escalation. The South Caucasus remains a region where every action can have far-reaching consequences, and the fragile balance can be upset at any moment.