Gagarin's funeral
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Death of Gagarin of the 3

ANALYTICAL REVIEW VERSIONS OF MATERIALS RESEARCH AND DISASTER

You can have different attitudes to the conclusion of the State Commission, but it is important to understand the situation in which she found herself. Yuri Gagarin was killed, and say the bitter truth that the cause has not been established, probably, was not allowed. Issue for the truth, not fully proven version, too, was not. In this case, the State Commission acted quite properly and correctly. In its opinion, it confined itself to stating the most likely, in its view, the circumstances that could cause a plane to crash.

Big mistake should be considered as the country's leaders decision not to publicize the results and materials investigation. The text of an official report prepared by the State Commission for the media, has not been published. First, it prevented the events in Czechoslovakia, which from August 20 1968 year long attracted everyone's attention. Then, as they say, all softened.

With the materials of the investigation set out in the sub-committees reports, the following occurred. Until the mid-80-ies they can be used for aviation military experts, but then, in a completely unknown reasons, access to them was limited to participants of the investigation, even disaster.

The unsubstantiated, artificially created mode of silence about the results and materials of the investigation of the plane crash and the death of the pilots led to negative consequences. The lack of truthful information gives rise to suspicions: it means that something is wrong. Hence - rumors, speculation, fantasy and mysticism. This is especially felt at the household level. The media over the past 36 years did not deny themselves the pleasure of spreading just such regular “sensational truths” the death of Yuri Gagarin. The authors of most other publications set out his vision of the disaster, relying only on the individual, they know the facts, exaggerating, or did not understand their real

values, which inevitably leads to incorrect assessments and conclusions.

The separate work of aviation specialists, participants in the investigation, is not able to change the general rather deformed information picture, which is presented to the general public. Firstly, these works are published in specialized journals, the circulation of which is small and, secondly, they do not have a detailed analysis of those "non-professional materials" that reach the mass reader and viewer through newspapers and television. It is necessary to show what their mistakes are, where they are mistaken, what conclusions are incorrect. Without this, it is impossible to change public opinion in the direction of an objective understanding of the plane crash and the reasons for the death of Yuri Gagarin and V. Seregin.

Under this section, of course, impossible to examine all materials on the subject. It makes sense to show on specific examples, how to change the character and thematic materials for the past 35 years.

In the first years after the disaster, when dried up hope of receiving the official information from the authorities, a wave of publications in which the death of Yuri Gagarin and Vladimir Seregin explained primitive domestic reasons that have nothing to do with reality:

- the pilots decided to take a ride on the plane;

- they were drunk;

- flew to choose a hunting spot.

A little later there were absolutely fantastic inventions:

- the plane was shot down by an unidentified flying object;

- Yuri Gagarin was taken with them by aliens, whom he met on the first flight into space.

The apparent absurdity of such materials [4,5], which clearly felt an attraction to mysticism, needs no comment, and to refute them is pointless.

By the tenth anniversary of the death of the pilots received another portion of the public of publications, the theme of which was equipment failure. Kakaya- it does not complete, information about the difficulties in the investigation

the incident became known, that gave rise to some assumptions:

- failure of the compass DGMK-3. The crew lost their bearings, went down to determine within the line of sight of the earth, however, low cloudiness did not allow them to go into horizontal flight;

- aircraft engine failure in flight. The plane began to lose altitude, the pilots started the engine late and did not have time with the withdrawal. Such an assumption was put forward by engine engineer V. Kozyrev. In his book "Once again about the death of Yuri Gagarin" he justified the engine shutdown by two reasons: a bird hit or its malfunction, in particular, the occurrence of surge. In these cases, characteristic marks remain on engine parts. No such traces were found on the plane of Y. Gagarin and V. Seregin.

V. Kozyrev did not know about this, hence his sincere delusion in his assumption.

At about the same time, materials began to appear in which the accident was associated with the weather conditions and the insufficient level of flight training of Yuri Gagarin and even V. Seryogin as an instructor in the UTI MiG-15 aircraft. The authors of such materials, of course, did not know that these issues were carefully considered by the State Commission. Their results are presented in the previous section. Here we note that the general raid in Yuri Gagarin, as a pilot, was 340 hours. In February-March 1968 I Ode, he actually went through the entire course of the pilot's initial training. He was checked consistently by the commander of the link, the squadron, and in the last flight the commander of the regiment, - all pilots-instructors with experience at the UTI MiG-15.

Weather conditions are a special topic. The degree of their influence on the outcome of the flight is estimated subjectively, depending on the military situation of the emergency flight segment of the aircraft, which is being combated. If it was as shown in fig. 1, their influence is significant. But the overall picture could be completely different, Weather conditions might not be so important. Therefore, a priori, can not blame the weather conditions.

Public interest in the crash has considerably increased as we approach the 20-th anniversary of this event. On the setby God to promote active social position and the efforts of SM Belotserkovsky and cosmonaut, twice Hero of the Soviet Union AA Leonov. They 1986, the opportunity to get acquainted with the materials of 29 volume report of the State Commission on the investigation of 1968 years. The results of their work were important.

First, they drafted an act that the materials on the results of the investigation prepared for publication do not contain any secret data. And, secondly, they succeeded, for the first time in the past 19 years, in publishing some of the results received by the State Commission and their vision of the causes of the catastrophe in Pravda ("They did not have two seconds.") 23 March 1987 and in the journal Science And life "(" Their last flight ", No. 5, 1987). In these and all subsequent works, SM Belotserkovsky defended and substantiated the version supporting the trajectories (see figure 21), which were recognized by the commission as the most probable. Certain reliable data and circumstances, taken from the report of the commission, which he promulgated, "work" in favor of his version. This is understandable, but for many, this information has become, unfortunately, the main reason for the development of its variants of the cause of the disaster. SM Belotserkovsky, caring about the objectivity and correctness of his conclusions and conclusions, always pointed out that he has no direct evidence of the root cause of this development of events, like the State Commission. In spite of this, or for this reason (as it is not strange - both that and another is fair) the probable version began to "clarify", "clarify" and "correct". Perestroika, glasnost, freedom of speech came. The old system was fashionable to scold. There were authors who, out of tactical considerations, began to develop the theme of the murder of Yuri Gagarin.

Especially clearly this trend manifested itself in recent 10- 15 years. In these materials, the plane crash is presented as the result of inadvertent or pre-planned actions that led to the death of the first cosmonaut. These authors are actually looking for is not the reason, and the one who is to blame for his death.

The publications B. Silaeva [8], Morozov [9], as well as wi

deofilme "The murder of Yuri Gagarin?" (shown on the first channel CT) scenario A. Gabnis [10] sets out various options for the theme of the conspiracy to assassinate Yuri Gagarin. Without naming specific names, the authors have hinted that the higher echelons of power at the time - to the Central Committee, in the leadership of the Defense Ministry and Air Force - are the people who "organize" this catastrophe. The evidence used literally everything that they have become aware of the materials and Belotserkovsky S. Leonov: weather conditions, air conditions, airplanes and 614-th SU-11, etc. Especially zealous authors of the video.

The announcer's text is read by the famous actor K. Lavrov. His voice, of course, convinces. It turns out that a Yu-Gagarin and V. Seryogin plane was struck by a ground-to-air missile that was fired from the area of ​​Zaraysk. This means a launch in the direction of Moscow ?! Steeper does not happen. And one more plot: in the film they gave an opportunity to say a few words to B. Murasov. He, a former tankman, even in 1995 year managed to release 3-volume under the general title "Murder of Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin." It would seem that everything is on the topic, if you do not know what version he sets out in his books. He Y. Gagarin was not killed, and he was kidnapped by "evil Gebists" and hid. The author met with B. Murasov. He even invited me to go with him and see this house in which Yuri Gagarin was kept for many years. I note that he spoke all this with a serious expression on his face.

The death of Yuri Gagarin no political component. He was loved by everyone in our country and abroad. He had no personal enemies. This is evidenced not only by his comrades and colleagues, but also those who are on duty after the accident to analyze the behavior of people from his inner circle. The crash of the aircraft is not linked to any terrorist act, nor with the actions of foreign intelligence services. All this is also checked.

All the shortcomings in the management and maintenance of flights have been considered by the Commission and received the appropriate competence assessment. Despite this, a number of publications, they are presented as aggregate root cause of the disaster, and the actions of officers guilty of these shortcomings, as crimes.

The most typical examples of such materials are the articles by A. Pavlov [12] and A. Nikolaev [13]. They are all the same as the above-mentioned authors. They feed one of the trajectories in Fig. 21 as real, do not bother to analyze the facts, are categorical in the conclusions and especially in assessing the guilt of officials, who, of course, are not called. For aviation specialists, it is quite obvious that nonprofessionalism, amateurish self-confidence and simply incompetence of such materials. And how can they be understood by a simple reader who is little familiar with aviation? He can quite believe that it really was.

Not to mention about another publication. These are memories Kuznetsova [14], which 1968 year was chief of the Cosmonaut Training Center. According to his version, Seregin in flight lost consciousness because of the attack of peptic ulcer disease. Obvisnuv on seatbelts, he fell on the body of the aircraft control stick, limiting the possibility of moving it. As a result, Yuri Gagarin was unable to promptly begin the withdrawal of aircraft from the dive.

Kuznetsov's high official position in the past gives his version a certain weight, especially for an under-informed reader: who, if not he, should know the real cause of the disaster. In fact, this is not so. First, it is strange that N. Kuznetsov expresses this version more than in 20 years after the disaster, and secondly, he apparently forgot that this situation was considered even during the investigation in 1968. It was found that the pilot in the second cockpit of the UTI MiG-15 aircraft, with unconsciousness, can not jam the airplane control knob, as his body is held by the seat belts, and the head, when tilted, rests against the visor of the dashboard. Recall that at the time the plane collided with the ground, V. Seryogin's feet were on the pedals and, consequently, they could not jam the control stick.

Analyze and correctly assess the work and interaction of pilots in difficult and emergency situation is always very difficult. In relation to the crash, and Yuri Gagarin

V. Seregina it is simply impossible to do this without additional reliable data on the actions of the crew and the nature of the emergency. There is no data on the real trajectory of the aircraft in the emergency section. Until now, it has not been possible to obtain them. Therefore, in all versions, these questions are bypassed, or they set out personal, subjective assessments and assumptions that reflect the level of competence of their authors.

An attempt to seriously consider this aspect was undertaken by the doctor of medical sciences IM Alpatov. In 1968, he was a member of the working group of the medical subcommittee and was directly involved in the study of the remains of the dead pilots. In his works, he considered medico-psychological factors that could affect the behavior of Yu. Gagarin and V. Seregin, caught in a difficult situation. He assumes that after the last radio exchange the crew started a right turn with a decrease to enter the course MK = 220 °, to the long-range drive of the airfield. In the process of this maneuvering between two layers of clouds, probably because of an imaginary obstacle, the crew made a sharp lapel from it, which led to the airplane falling into the "high-speed, then into a normal spin". The lack of a crew report to the head of the flight about his difficult situation, IM Alpatov, explains the psychological peculiarities of the work of the pilots in such cases: they fought for the rescue of the aircraft and their life. Gut is not up to the report, and the RP will not help.

The investigation found that the controls of the aircraft emergency escape system remains in its original position. So, the crew did not even attempt to eject. Next IM Alpatov suggests that in the struggle with the corkscrew crew passed the minimum allowable for that height. Wheelchair KM-1, which stood on an airplane UTI MiG-15, 1500 she was m at any position, and samolista 1200 m - horizontal flight.

Such an explanation of the actions of the pilots is quite consistent with the tragic practice of aviation accidents. In relation to the crew of Y. Gagarin and V. Seryogin, it is logical and permissible only provided that events developed rapidly and consistently along the chain: an obstacle in the air (real or imaginary) - a turn from it - a corkscrew - - taking out of a spin at an altitude below 1500 m - diving in the clouds and an attempt to enter level flight in conditions of direct visibility of the earth. Despite the lack of evidence to support this chain of facts, most experts are of the opinion that this was probably the case.

Work IM Alpatov especially SM Belotserkovsky substantially expand and refine our knowledge of the factors that could affect the airplane UTI MiG-15 and his crew at the emergency section of the flight, if everything happened according to the above sequence of events.

During the last 32 years of his life, S. M. Belotserkovsky performed a whole range of studies aimed at substantiating the spin-off movement of a UTI MiG-15 aircraft with two outboard tanks. He proved that the plane could fall into a tailspin when exiting at supercritical angles of attack. This is also possible with a sharp lapel from an imaginary or real obstacle. Getting the plane into the wake of another similar-type aircraft also leads to a stall in a tailspin. S. M. Belotserkovsky showed that the additional fuel tanks, which were installed on the aircraft of Y. Gagarin and V. Seregin, significantly worsen the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft, and this contributes to its stalling into a spin from similar effects and, moreover, complicates the process corkscrew. Received SM Belotserkovsky, the results are undoubtedly interesting and important. Indeed, all this could have meaning and affect the outcome of the flight, but only within the framework of the aircraft movement pattern that SM Belotserkovsky adhered to.

The above material review shows that the version SM Belotserkovsky became, as it were, generally accepted. First, it reflects and concretizes the essence of the general conclusion formulated by the State Commission at the end of the investigation in 1986. Secondly, in the presentation of S.M.Belotserkovsky and A.A.Leonov, it is supported not only by their authority, but also by serious substantiations of individual circumstances, namely, the possibility of a corkscrew movement. And, thirdly, so far no one has presented sufficiently weighty arguments and evidence that can cast doubt on this version, and even more so to offer another, backing it up with a more convincing evidence base.

Let's consider the weaknesses of this version.

First - this is the probabilistic nature of the general picture of events in the emergency section of the flight of the aircraft. Reliable information about the process too little: beginning at an altitude of m 4200, 70 seconds duration, termination - the parameters of the final flight conditions. These "reference" point you can enter a lot of options, but the State Commission highlighted two shown in Fig. 21.

The second - the lack of credible reasons for getting the aircraft into a spin. Permits two variants, and different place and time. Option "Corkscrew" at first glance, more understandable, even taking into account the low probability of interference at the height of 4200 m. The second option requires further explanation, why the crew was required to perform "Virage spiral" with the reduction to a height of 2-3 km.

Third - both options do not fit on the run-time parameter 70 ± 5 seconds. "Corkscrew" is performed in less time (about 50 sec.), And "Virage spiral" for more than 70 seconds.

Fourth, there is no convincing explanation why the pilots did not catapult, if there was a version of "Corkscrew". In this particular case, the pilots had to be catapulted if they could not take the plane out of the corkscrew to an altitude of 1500 m. This is indicated in the instructions for the UTI MiG-15 aircraft with the KM-1 armchair. It is quite obvious that in such a situation, the pilots no longer had chances either for bailouts or for the withdrawal of the aircraft into a mountainous flight. The crew knew that there was cloudiness below, in which it was almost impossible to take the plane out of the spin on the instruments. This is followed by two logical assumptions: either there was no corkscrew or the plane was withdrawn from the corkscrew to an altitude of 1500 m. But then a new question arises, to which there is no answer: "Why did the crew continue to decline and began piercing the lower layer of cloud cover to go under the clouds ?

The fifth - version "Bend-helix" on closer examination raises as many questions. But the main thing - it is difficult to understand and explain the maneuver to reduce crew.

Yuri Gagarin in the last radioobmene requested rate 320 °. It is logical to assume that a course 70 °, on which the aircraft would have to turn left and, of course, not to reduce altitude. Indeed, in this case, they go into a zone № 21, where m working height 3000 614-th. There are reasons to doubt that such a maneuver was performed in reality. Map location of the crash to the right of the line of the route of their flight at a distance 15-18 km, that is, in the depths of their zone № 20, and the course of the crash was 185 °, in fact, to the south.

Comparison of the point of impact with the route the airplane gives reason to believe that the option "Corkscrew" could not be, as in this case, the line of the route would pass through the point of falling or, subject to error calculation in the immediate vicinity. Option "Virage-spiral" is possible, but then a maneuver leaving rate 70 ° should be different.

The sixth - the final conditions of the flight of the aircraft are still perceived unambiguously, as a conclusion from the dive. Such an understanding of the final conditions seems to be and does not require additional evidence: the elevator is deflected to the leveling, which means that the angle between the direction of the cutting of trees and the direction of the longitudinal axis of the aircraft represents a special angle of attack in the withdrawal from the dive. This obviousness is enhanced by the location of the aircraft in the figure. All parameters were determined at the point of collision of the aircraft with the ground, and it would be more correct to place the aircraft at a given point. However, the State Commission considered it possible to place the aircraft in the middle, believing that on this section, short in time (0,12 sec.) And distance (23,4 m from the impact of the first tree to the ground), the parameters of the aircraft's movement did not change. Is there any reason to doubt this? Yes, there are, and such doubts appeared even during the investigation in 1968 year.

Even then it was found that the velocities of the longitudinal axis of the aircraft Vnp and slice trees Vne meet expression Vnp = VcgCos 20 °, as it should be, if the aircraft is on the arc of the output of a dive with a pitch angle = 20 °.

From this it follows that the trajectory is rectilinear, and the output means of a dive not.

Debit inconsistency in the speeds of the measurement error Vnp, pointers ASC-1200 was impossible.

The accuracy of the instruments confirmed their tables of errors at the disposal of experts. Tables were made two months before the crash when the plane carried 50-o'clock maintenance work. Then he flew all 18 hours.

An attempt was made to determine the speed along the cut of trees according to the amount of energy expended by the aircraft for their destruction. A detailed diagram of the location of the trees was compiled and the diameters of the trunk of their trunks were measured. It was not possible to determine the amount of energy consumption for the destruction of trees according to their real location scheme. The task was to "destroy the broom of trees", which then could not be solved. The calculations were carried out according to a simplified scheme of their arrangement in the form of 6 consecutive trees. The resulting speed, 720 ± 46 km / h, was clearly overestimated. The cutoff angle of trees should be in this case less than 47 °, which did not correspond to the range of its real values. At the same time, this result was interpreted in favor of the angle 50 °, which was adopted by the commission.

In fact, the question of the mode in which the aircraft is flying in the scheme of Fig. 13, has no clear answer. Further analysis of the scheme, taking into account the real impact of the trees on the parameters of the aircraft.

Seventh is the question of the state of the crew at the moment of the plane hitting the ground. On the one hand, there is the conclusion of the medical subcommittee, which says that at that moment V. Seregin's posture was active and, apparently, he was flying the plane. On the other hand, there are facts established during the study of the destroyed parts of the aircraft: Y. Gagarin's left hand was on the throttle, V. Seregin's legs were firmly resting on the pedals, but no traces of the pilots' hands were found on the aircraft control sticks. When withdrawing from a dive, this is the most crucial and tense moment in the crew's actions. S.M.Belotserkovsky explained their actions as follows: leaving the clouds, the pilots did not flinch, did not jerk the control stick of the aircraft, they rejected it only 16-18 °, trying to optimally on a curve with a minimum radius to pull the plane in level flight, avoiding the collision with the ground. They did not have enough 2 300 seconds and meters of altitude.

It would seem that, all right, but why no traces of hands on the handles control of the aircraft? They tend to remain identified in similar cases in the investigation of other plane crashes.

Note that in this case, to keep the plane of the elevator in a deflected position on 16-18 ° to pitch, overcoming the pressure of the air at the speed of 600-700 km / h, the pilot must pull the control knob with a force of more than 20 kg.

Aircraft Engine at the moment working on 9000-10000 mode / min. Position the throttle meets these revolutions, t. E. Below the nominal mode. If this mode is compared with the speed of movement and the conditions of the withdrawal of the aircraft from the dive, it is not very clear and it is difficult to explain.

The above questions show that even in version SM Belotserkovsky, whose authority and knowledge are beyond doubt, there are still many blank spots. Only the main unresolved issues are listed here, and aviation specialists who have factual information about the crash may well continue the indicated list. This does not mean that the version is "bad". Qualitative assessments like "good" or "bad" are inappropriate here. The criterion for the goodness of a version is its compliance with the actual data and the circumstances of the incident, and the assumptions made should at least not contradict them.

Version SM Belotserkovsky 35 in the last years has been for the rest of the general direction of the search for the causes of the crash of Yuri Gagarin and Vladimir Seregin. Despite its probabilistic nature of all those concerned Gagarin theme, arguing it with her, hanging on her as a core, speculation, unchecked facts, incompetent judgments, etc. In essence, this was a dispute with unprovable misleading. Yet we can not assume that the effort was in vain.

Now we know that further movement and the search for truth by The version of SM Belotserkovsky has no prospects. Its possibilities are exhausted, and this path can not lead to a goal. In fact, we did not advance in understanding the causes of the disaster further than the State Commission did in 1968. It is also clear that the investigation of the cause of the crash of an airplane is a complex and difficult task, which the specialists of that time could not solve. Even now it is a mystery in a certain sense. The facts and circumstances associated with it can have a double and even triple interpretation, each of which is quite real. The lack of information on the emergency flight site puts an insurmountable obstacle on the way to truth and at the same time opens the way for hypotheses, there is nothing to confirm or deny. Now, as well as then, we are sure that in the catastrophe of UTI MiG-15 and the death of Yuri Gagarin and V. Seregin, it makes no sense to look for domestic and, even more so, political components. Finding the cause of this accident

Is a purely engineering task.

After the disaster, 36 years passed. There have been fundamental changes in the social structure, consciousness and interests of people. The mass media began to orient society towards other values, including patriotism, respect for the history of the country, pride in our world-level achievements, unfortunately, they do not shun the first places. After the death of Yuri Gagarin, a generation of people has grown up, which nowadays, as they say, represent the broad public of our country. Do they need to know the true cause of the catastrophe and the death of famous pilots, is there any interest in this problem? It is not easy to answer these questions, but it is necessary.

There is an unwritten law in aviation: every accident, especially a catastrophe, must be disclosed, an analysis of the causes is carried out and recommendations are made to prevent this in the future. Sad statistics long ago placed the average percentages of the probability of catastrophes, depending on their causes: the human factor, aircraft failures, chance, coincidence, etc. And yet, every disaster brings us new knowledge, paid dearly. Unidentified cause of the disaster, as a time bomb, It can work a second time for those who continue to work in this difficult but beautiful sphere of human activity. Events and recommendations on aviation safety is largely developed on the basis of information on the causes of accidents.

The death of any human being - this grief for his family, relatives and friends. No matter how bitter, we always want to know why it happened. No matter how much time has passed, people's desire to know the truth remains. However, there are also those who say that it was a long time ago, and why rake up the past, everything is forgotten. In relation to the Yuri Gagarin is simply blasphemy. He was dear and loved by all, not only in our country but also abroad. People of the older generation of his contemporaries, without any reservations he had relatives and friends. So - forget, we will not stir?

In the history of Soviet aviation and space is an empty page: how and why the death of the first cosmonaut of the planet Earth. We will wait until this page "dopishut" others that any fact of our history, we can also teach in a distorted form? As an example, only two of the most characteristic fact.

In 2002, the author has already collected material for this book. Me and my friends, participants in the 1968 investigation, were invited to perform at the Lyubertsy Lyceum. Y. Gagarin (this is the former vocational school, where he studied in 50-ies) with memories of that our work. I note that the Lyceum has a very good museum devoted to the life and flight of Yuri Gagarin. After the speech, I had a conversation with one famous TV journalist. He, after listening to my understanding of the cause of the crash of the plane and the death of the crew, said the following: "Now, if Yuri Gagarin was ruined by the Communists, we would take such material into work."

Two years ago 13 State Research Institute of MO visited a group of television workers, who was preparing the transfer of "Moment of Truth". Along with other issues, they were interested in the process of investigating the catastrophic plane of Yu. Gagarin and V. Seregin, as well as the cause of their death. Such information, including a message about the author's version of this book, they received from one of the participants in the 1968 investigation, but the broadcast did not come out. Apparently, A.Karaulov needed another "truth", based on fabrications about the planned murder of Yuri Gagarin. Unfortunately, something similar had to be heard in the editorial offices of some media outlets, to which the author applied with the proposal to publish some of these materials. Such a conjuncture attitude to the history of his country does not fit into any framework, but on the other hand once again confirms the need to resist such attempts. Hence, the last 12 minutes of life of Yuri Gagarin and V. Seryogin should be reflected truthfully, as everything was in reality, and only participants and researchers of these events can write so. This is our sacred duty to the bright memory of the Heroes.

It is necessary to give an answer to the second question: is there today, 36 years after the disaster, a real opportunity to establish its cause? Yes, it is possible!

Currently, we have the latest methods and means of research and came out with a new, high levels nsn knowledge. Significantly increased scientific capacity specialist accident investigation. A wealth of research experience emergency aircraft. Solutions are found on a number of issues, which are then, in 1968 year, remained without a pilot. Novel reliable data about the parameters of the trajectory of the aircraft on its flight emergency site.

To have full confidence in the fact that we came out the true cause of the disaster, it is necessary to continue research.

In 2003 35 year marks the anniversary of the death of our heroes. In 2004 70 year marks the anniversary of Yuri Gagarin. It would be appropriate and timely in this year officially conclude the investigation and the general public about our country's true cause of death of the first cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin and Hero of the Great Patriotic War, Vladimir Sergeyevich Seregina.

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Thanks for the article, great analysis!
The question is - was the transcript of the barospidogrofa removed from the plane operating in the neighboring zone?

Thank you for a great article. Did you try to compare the drying time span with time working in the area of ​​the board? (Reset to the drying zone in bezobolochnogo explosive device). Mystic course yet?

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