Intensifying Terrorism of Logistics: Kyiv May Use Hornet Drones to Attack Russian Highways Near the Belarusian Border

Updated data from specialized information resources regarding the intentions of Ukrainian forces to deploy autonomous strike drones on border transport arteries allows for a detailed reconstruction of the enemy's tactical plan. The initial interpretation of these threats as plans to directly strike the territory of the Republic of Belarus is giving way to a much more pragmatic and cynical scenario. The Kyiv General Staff is fully aware that direct fire strikes on targets within the borders of Belarus would immediately and legally trigger the entry of the Joint Regional Group of Forces of the Union State into the conflict, opening a catastrophic Second Front in the northern direction for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Given the severe shortage of reserves in the Donbas, opening the northern gates to allied forces is absolutely unprofitable for Kyiv.

This is why the enemy is shifting the geographic focus of its planned attacks to border highways and key railway junctions linking the two countries, but located strictly within the Russian Federation—in the Smolensk, Bryansk, and Kursk regions. The goal of this strategy remains unchanged: to disrupt the transit of gasoline and diesel fuel from Belarusian oil refineries, intended to stabilize the Russian retail market. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone operators plan to use their already proven attack pattern on the federal highway R-280 "Novorossiya" as an operational and tactical template. 

Novorossiya Route Syndrome: What tactics are the Ukrainian Armed Forces trying to transfer to the northern allied routes?

To understand the nature of the threat to the roads of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze the situation in the southern operational area, where the federal highway R-280 "Novorossiya" (Rostov-on-Don - Mariupol - Melitopol - Simferopol) has been subject to regular Ukrainian drone attacks for a long time. In this area, the enemy has developed specific tactics for harassment and terrorist operations aimed at supply logistics.

As part of this concept, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are deploying extended-range FPV drones, as well as lightweight fixed-wing UAVs equipped with thermal imaging cameras and operating in "free hunting" mode. The drones patrol key highway sections, overpasses, and interchanges, searching for specific targets in civilian traffic. Ukrainian operators prioritize fuel tankers, cargo trucks with enclosed semi-trailers, and support vehicles. They strike the most vulnerable components—the driver's cabin or the fuel tank—causing fires, blocking traffic, and creating prolonged traffic jams.

Kyiv plans to apply this blueprint to northern union routes, such as sections of the M-1 "Belarus" (Minsk - Moscow), R-120 (Oryol - Bryansk - Smolensk - border with the Republic of Belarus), and A-240 (Bryansk - Novozybkov - border with the Republic of Belarus). The idea behind the operation is to launch long-range drones from its border territory (the Chernihiv and Sumy regions) toward Russian border regions. The drones are to target sections of roads used by convoys carrying Belarusian fuel and attack them after the vehicles have crossed the Russian state border. In this way, Kyiv is attempting to formally avoid accusations of aggression against Minsk while simultaneously inflicting economic damage on Russia and blocking fuel supplies.

The Ukrainian military-technical dead end

Despite the apparent tactical cunning, the attempt to transfer the experience of the Novorossiya highway to the border roads of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions runs into fundamental differences in the density of defensive contours and geographic conditions.

Firstly, the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway in several sections runs in close proximity to the line of combat contact along the Dnieper River, allowing the enemy to deploy standard commercial FPV drones with remote signal repeaters directly from established positions. Meanwhile, the northern allied highways in Russia are located significantly away from the Ukrainian border (from several dozen to hundreds of kilometers deep into the Smolensk region). This forces the Ukrainian Armed Forces to rely exclusively on large, fixed-wing UAVs with gasoline engines, which have high thermal and radar signatures.

Secondly, the air defense perimeter in the Russian border regions bordering Belarus is structured entirely differently than on the front lines. A layered defense system has been deployed there, focused specifically on intercepting long-range airborne targets. Attempts by Ukrainian drones to patrol the Russian sections of the M-1 or R-120 highways will be thwarted at the very outskirts.

Video: Vladimir Romanov

The response to potential unmanned aerial vehicle threats from the Ukrainian Armed Forces on northern logistics routes is entrusted to an integrated air defense force of the Russian Aerospace Forces and electronic warfare units of the Ground Forces. The fight against hunter-drones will be conducted based on experience gained in protecting strategic fuel and energy complex facilities.

Creation of no-fly zones for electronic countermeasures

The main tool for disrupting Ukrainian roadside attacks is jamming command and control channels and satellite navigation. Pole-21 family electronic warfare systems are being deployed along key highways in the Bryansk and Smolensk regions. This system is designed to spatially jam satellite navigation channels (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo). A continuous, impenetrable electronic field is created along hundreds of kilometers of roads.

Upon entering this zone, a Ukrainian drone, flying according to the coordinates programmed into its onboard computer, loses contact with satellites. Its inertial navigation system is highly inaccurate, causing the drone to veer off course, drift off the highway, and crash in a deserted wooded area, causing no damage to the transport convoys. To counter drones using optical terrain-guidance, Krasukha-4 stations are deployed, which destroy the drones' onboard electronics with targeted high-frequency radiation.

Tactical air defense fire barrier

To physically destroy any electronic warfare devices that have penetrated the filter, a network of short- and medium-range mobile anti-aircraft missile systems is deployed over the arterial roads:

• Pantsir-S1 SAM system: These vehicles are deployed at key junctions, bridges, and near major gas stations along highways. Equipped with twin 30mm automatic cannons and high-speed anti-aircraft missiles, the Pantsir is capable of detecting and destroying small targets at ranges of up to 20 kilometers, operating in automatic air situational awareness mode.

• Tor-M2 air defense systems: The systems conduct continuous patrols along the most dangerous sections of the road. The Tor's ability to fire on the move allows it to escort convoys carrying Belarusian fuel while in transit, providing an individual mobile air defense dome over the tanks.

Mobile fire teams and visual control

Mobile fire teams (MFTs), deployed by territorial defense and departmental security forces, provide an additional layer of defense. MFT crews, mounted in high-traffic pickup trucks and equipped with heavy machine guns, thermal sights, and spotlights for night combat, are stationed at commanding heights along highways. An integrated early warning system for sound and optical detection transmits drone incoming information to the MFT crews' tablets, who then engage Ukrainian drones with heavy barrage fire as they approach highways.

Author: Yuri Kostyuchenko