Identification of pilot error. Scientific opinion on aviation.
Identification of pilot error. Scientific opinion on aviation.

Identification of pilot error


So, for many decades the world Statistics Aviation Safety Aviation Safety Record assures us that more than half the accident is the fault of the pilot. No sophisticated professional selection or training, or punitive administrative methods or skillful management does not move the matter: the pilot with enviable persistence continues to "make mistakes". At the same time, anyone working on the ground party aviation industry statistics distributes a rare property of mistakes.

The very term "pilot error", used for decades to classify (investigate and prevent causes), demonstrates surprising inconsistency. All the more surprising is its persistent use. If you spend pererassledovanie of all accidents in the past decade, given the following reasons for the proportion of accidents pilot error or a multiple decrease over it hung a lot of questions:

Many approach accidents could not have been classified previously due to wind shear and micro-stalls, although these phenomena have always existed and were relatively recently discovered. The incidents were more often attributed to the pilot with the wording “failed to control the aircraft” and the conclusion “lack of professional training”.

Construction of the aircraft and systems are still performed such that the individual transactions in flight are very critical and the risk is high. The success of automation, computerization made it possible to reduce the workload on the crew. But the prevention of human error with a computer has a probability of replacing one mistake to another.

The regulation of working time and the flight apart from the basic provisions has a lot of loopholes, which are actively used by flight services to perform the carriage. However, it is known that in a state of chronic fatigue occurs critical decrease operator options pilot. And it is the imperfection of the laws, standards, product of the human brain lead to incidents.

Existing standards have to break because of the economic pressure. In the myth of the "error" in the pilot matryoshka hidden another wicked myth of security priorities. Earnings, income and free competition in the airline and in a state monopoly concentrated load on the main process of the whole system: the flight and its operator - pilot.

Elementary, clean earth, counting procedures lead to accidents. For example, counting the volume of fueling - a constant source of errors in the history of aviation.

Our pilots flew for decades poorly equipped routes of Siberia and the Far East. In these cases, instructed to maintain the width of the track, corridors with "using complex methods of piloting" up to the celestial. But then it is fair to make an amendment to the "mistakes" of the orientations of losses and deviations from the slopes.

Flow control and maintenance of aircraft at many airports in practice happens if you ignore safety instructions. As long as nothing happens, all is well. But if there was an emergency, it is not difficult to find the culprit - a pilot or controller.

Over time, improved landing systems, equipment and approach the runway. But at the same time takeoff and especially - equipment taxiing left to load the pilots on their "mistake".

Investigation of accidents in our view, investigative techniques already discredited itself stability Pilot "errors" in safety statistics. After all, the control strategy in the theory of systems is considered necessarily in the improvement of the parameters of any system. Here we are witnessing the stability of the causes of AP and their classifications.

Example: "flight recorders". One of them is called the CVR cockpit voice recorder, a crew voice recorder. Although, as former IFALPA administrator Henk Vermeulen noted, the device actually does not record voice, but sound (sound recorder). Let's try to figure it out, since there seems to be a major methodological error in the investigation of incidents.

From modern psychophysiology it is known that in the communication of people accounted for a smaller part of the auditory canal, a large part - on a non-verbal, so-called "body language» body language. To properly evaluate what people say, it is necessary not only to hear (sign information - 45%), but also see (analog information - 55%) as he does it. Otherwise, we can only assumeAnd not be sure what happened on board the aircraft. With this, most of the information we lack.

Krome, the range of investigative attention on the "sound recorder" in the time of their work is immeasurably wider than the range and distribution of the attention of the pilot in one time or another flight. And if the pilot ignored any background sounds that they hear investigators, then it may have been good reasons: because dynamical perception - a powerful defense mechanism against stress information. It is also possible the pilot had good reason not to react to the sound signal, which investigators believe is extremely important. But that's not all.

There is a constant psychological defense against recorders pilots and true information is transferred, if necessary, not with words but with gestures, body language. The arguments given here irrefutably confirmed discernible difference between the standardized information of the investigation and that obtained now from CHIRP - a system of voluntary reporting.


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